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Government Regulation and the First Amendment
Religion Clauses-An Analysis of the NLRB
Jurisdiction Over Parochial Schools and Their
Teachers
Robert M. Bastress, Jr.*
With the tenacles of government regulatory agencies reaching into
all aspects of modern life, some conflict between religious organizations and these agencies is inevitable. The problem is not a new
one,I but recently the conflicts have become more frequent and more
substantial: agencies and churches have fought over laws,' antiemployment discrimination laws, 35 minimum standards for private
schools,' and labor relations laws.
Quite obviously, these encounters raise issues of great importance. As a nation, we have assigned religious values a central role
in both our constitution and our social environ, yet we have strenously tried to avoid state promotion, impairment, or involvement
with religion. This governmental neutrality has not been easily
maintained, even in simpler times; and the growth of government
regulation has strained our commitment to separation of church and
*
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1. For example, the Mormons in the 19th century and the Jehovah's Witnesses in earlier
decades of this century had frequent encounters with government regulation. See Prince v.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1878).
2. Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church, 210 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 1013 (1954) (FLSA applied to church's printing operation); Marshall v. Pacific Union
Conference of Seventh Day Adventist, Civ. No. 75-3032-R (D.C. Cal. March 23, 1977) (FLSA
Equal Pay Act applied to lay employees of church educational branch).
3. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972) (Title VII of Civil Rights Act
cannot, consistently with the first amendment, apply to church-minister relations). See also
Hubbell, Civil Rights Impact on the Church, 21 CAm. LAw. 339 (1975).
4. Ohio v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976). See also Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (members of Amish faith could withdraw their children from
public schools after 8th grade in order to provide alternative education at home and to
preserve free exercise rights).
5. E.g., Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted,
98 S.Ct. 1231 (1978); Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. 3164 (E.D. Pa. No. 76-279 July 7,
1977), cert. denied on interloc. appeal, 98 S.Ct. 3071 (1978).
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state. The choices are not simple. Real and substantial societal
concerns, as in ending sex discrimination or preventing labor strife,
are implicated by the regulatory activities and are pitted against
important religious interests and a growing movement to restrict
governmental pervasiveness.
The conflict between the regulatory agencies and the churches
poses penetrating questions regarding the meaning of, and the interplay between, the first amendment's two religion clauses.' The
establishment clause prohibits government from making any law
respecting the establishment of religion, and the free exercise clause
prohibits government from impairing the free exercise of religion.
Between them, they have created a tension that the Supreme Court
has struggled to keep taut for at least thirty years.7
By intruding into the operations of a religiously affiliated institution, government regulation can impose unjustifiably inhibitory
burdens on, and become excessively entangled with, the institution.
The regulatory scheme could thereby violate both the free exercise
and establishment clauses. The nature and extent of the intrusion
and the character of the institution are the principal variables that
determine the regulation's legitimacy. These variables interlock the
two clauses, and that interlocking creates an excellent opportunity
for observing the relationship and interdependence of the policies
that undergird the religion clauses.
To illustrate the first amendment implications of government regulation of church-affiliated institutions, this article will focus on
the assertion of jurisdiction by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) over employment relations between teachers and parochial
primary and secondary schools. Several major controversies have
developed recently between the schools and the Board,8 and those
6. The relevant portions of the first amendment's "establishment" and "free exercise"
clauses read: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; . . ."U.S. CoNs-r. amend. I.
7. The Court first discussed the relationship between the free exercise and the establishment clauses, and first applied the latter to the states through the 14th amendment in
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
8. The cases cited in note 5 supra found the NLRB's regulation of parochial school teachers to be unconstitutional. In addition, see, e.g., Cardinal Timothy Manning, 223 N.L.R.B.
1218 (1976), appeal docketed, No. 77-1286 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 1977); Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216 N.L.R.B. 249 (1975). Commentators have also noted the confrontation. Serritella, The National Labor Relations Board and Nonprofit, Charitable, Religious
Institutions, 21 CATH. LAW. 323 (1975); Note, The Free Exercise Clause, the NLRA, and
ParochialSchool Teachers, 126 U. PA. L. Rav. 631 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Free Exercise
Clausel.
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cases have crystalized the elements and issues that control administrative regulation of church-related institutions.'
Part I of this article provides essential background on NLRB decisions regarding regulation of parochial schools and presents the
Board's rationales for exercising its jurisdiction. Part II scans the
doctrines that have evolved for construing the first amendment
religion clauses, with attention directed first at free exercise cases,
and then at establishment clause developments. Part III suggests
an appropriate analytical model for regulation cases and then applies this model to NLRB regulation of parochial schools and
teachers. The discussion culminates in Part IV, which identifies
pluralism and individualism as the overriding first amendment
values interrelating the religion clauses.
The article unabashedly maintains, through the analysis in Parts
III and IV, that NLRB regulation of parochial schools and their
teachers impermissibly intrudes upon the decision-making processes which the first amendment has committed to private individuals and institutions. The inhibitory effects and church-state entanglement caused by the Board's regulatory activities and powers violate both the free exercise and establishment clauses.
I.

NLRB

BACKGROUND

Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act'0 in 1935 to
secure for workers the rights to organize and bargain collectively,
and to assuage the causes of serious labor disputes that were obstructing commerce." The Act created a National Labor Relations
Board to develop and administer employment relations law through
adjudication, supervision, and rulemaking. 2 Today, the Board's
responsibilities include conducting elections, investigating and processing charges of unfair labor practices, and determining the appropriate remedy when an unfair practice is found. 3 The Board's
jurisdictional powers have consistently been construed to be coex9. The Supreme Court has recognized significance of these issues by agreeing to hear
argument in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 98 S. Ct. 1231 (1978), granting cert. from
559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
11. Findings and declaration of policy, National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter cited
as NLRA], § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
12. NLRA, § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1970).
13. NLRA, §§ 8-11, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158-161 (1970).
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tensive with the reaches of the federal commerce clause.14
The Board has, however, exercised discretion in asserting its jurisdiction, and has generally declined to act when the effect on commerce is de minimis or when countervailing policies militate against
Board involvement.' Prior to 1970, the Board thus declined to enter
into regulation of noncommercial educational or religious institutions. 6 The Board did, however, regularly exercise jurisdiction over
church-owned facilities that had commercial characteristics, even if
nonprofit. 7
The Board adhered to its commercial/noncommercial distinction
in dealing with religious and educational institutions through 1970,
when, in a major shift of policy, it decided Cornell University."
Changed economic conditions persuaded the Board that it should
assert jurisdiction over employment disputes at Cornell and Syracuse Universities. By the Board's standards, the schools had grown
to have substantial impact on interstate commerce, both in their
economic activities and in their acceptance of out-of-state students. Moreover, labor disputes had become much more commonplace on college campuses, and a need for uniform and comprehensive treatment of those problems had developed. 0 The increasingly
active role of the federal government in financing and influencing
14.

E.g., NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224 (1963). See generally R. GORMAN,

BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 21-22 (1976).

15. E.g., Association of Hebrew Teachers of Metropolitan Detroit, 210 N.L.R.B. 1053
(1974); Hollow Tree Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 635 (1950). See generally, GORMAN, supra note
14, at 22-26.
16. E.g., Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, 109 N.L.R.B. 859 (1954); Columbia University, 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (1951). In Lutheran Church Synod, the Board declined jurisdiction over
a small, nonprofit radio station that presented religious and classical music, public service
programs, news, and religious features, but no advertising. The Board concluded that the
exercise of jurisdiction over such institutions did not effectuate the Act's purposes; impact
on commerce was small and labor unrest slight.
17. E.g., Sunday School Bd. of the Southern Baptist Convention, 92 N.L.R.B. 801 (1950)
(church publishing arm that edited, published, and distributed religious materials for the
church's Sunday schools and its retail store was sufficiently wrapped in commerce to warrant
NLRB intervention).
18. 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970), overruling Columbia University, 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (1951). In
Cornell, the employers, Cornell and Syracuse Universities, had petitioned for NLRB jurisdiction in order to avoid subjection to the less accommodating New York state labor law agency.
Brown, Professors and Unions: The Faculty Senate: An Effective Alternative to Collective
Bargaining in Higher Education?, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 252, 304 n.208 (1970); Kahn, The
NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of Policymaking through Adjudication, 21
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 63, 64-65 n.2 (1973).
19. 183 N.L.R.B. at 329-30, 332-34.
20. Id. at 334.
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higher education helped to justify NLRB intervention. 2'
The Board nudged its jurisdiction further into the area of education and religion with its opinion in First Church of Christ,Scientist
in Boston, Mass. (ChristianScientists),2 which ordered a church to
negotiate with electricians and carpenters employed in the church's
Boston complex. The complex included a substantial publishing
operation and several buildings with stores and apartments. The
employer contended that its religious beliefs compelled it to publish
and propagate its message, that a substantial part of the employees'
time was spent on facilities used for religious purposes, and that the
Board was, therefore, unable to intervene in a manner consistent
with the free exercise clause. The Board rejected that conclusion by
invoking the Jeffersonian distinction between "belief" and
"conduct"-the former being absolutely protected, the latter only
23
to the extent it does not conflict with an overriding state interest.
The Board said it had a "compelling" interest in avoiding or minimizing industrial strife and the church could claim no greater first
amendment immunity than lay employers who in prior cases had
made free exercise claims against labor relations restrictions. 2' Finally, the Board found the Christian Science Church employees to
be engaged in activities that were "in the normally accepted sense
commercial." There was, therefore, no reason for the Board to
withhold its jurisdiction as a matter of discretion.
Building on Cornell and ChristianScientists, the Board extended
its jurisdiction in Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore" to
21. Id. at 332.
22. 194 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1972).
23. Id. at 1007. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (Mormon practice of
polygamy was "conduct" and thus, according to Jeffersonian thought, not entitled to absolute
first amendment protection); Little, Thomas Jefferson's Religious Views and Their Influence
on the Supreme Court's Interpretation of the First Amendment, 26 CATH. U. L. REv. 57
(1976). For further discussion, and criticism, of the belief-conduct distinction, see notes 3436, 43-48 and accompanying text infra.
24. 194 N.L.R.B. at 1007-08. The Board relied heavily on decisions that rejected free
exercise defenses by individual employers who claimed compliance with NLRA would violate
their religious tenets. E.g., Cap Santa Vue v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Western
Meat Packers, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 444 (1964), enf. denied on other grnds., 350 F.2d 804 (10th
Cir. 1965). The Board saw no reason to allow "greater [1st amendment] protection" to
churches than to individuals. 194 N.L.R.B. at 1008. There was no analysis of Board-Church
entanglement. For a contrary view of the applicability of Cap Santa Vue and similar decisions, see Free Exercise Clause, supra note 8, at 668-71; see also notes 244-248 and accompanying text infra.
25. 194 N.L.R.B. at 1009.
26. 216 N.L.R.B. 249 (1975). The Board had previously exercised jurisdiction over a few
parochial schools, see Henry M. Hald High School Ass'n., The Sisters of St. Joseph, 213
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include parochial schools. The Board there grouped the five Catholic secondary and elementary schools of Baltimore into a single bargaining unit through their archdiocesan structure. The Board concluded that the schools' collective impact on commerce and their
potential for disruptive labor relations justified Board intervention.2 7 Naturally, the archdiocese contended that the schools' religious character precluded NLRB supervision of their employee relations. The Board rejected the argument by distinguishing between
''completely religious" schools and those that are "just religiously
associated." The Board would decline to exercise jurisdiction "only"
for completely religious schools. Because the archdiocese schools did
not limit their instruction to religious matters, they were characterized as just religiously associated and hence appropriate subjects for
NLRB regulation. 8 "That the Archdiocese seeks to provide an eduN.L.R.B. 415 (1975); Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark, 204 N.L.R.B. 159 (1973), but
Baltimore was the first time that the Board considered the full statutory, policy, and constitutional implications of asserting its jurisdiction over such institutions.
27. 216 N.L.R.B. at 250. Labor unrest had already hit New York City's and San Francisco's Catholic schools, and the American Federation of Teachers had undertaken full-scale
efforts to organize private schools. Boles, Persistent Problems of Church, State, and
Education, 1 J.L. & EDUC. 601, 605 (1972).
28. 216 N.L.R.B. at 250. See also Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 227 N.L.R.B. 1178 (1977);
Cardinal Timothy Manning, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1976). The completely religious/religiously
associated distinction had an insecure precedential basis when the Baltimore case was decided. The Board has cited Lutheran Church Synod, 109 N.L.R.B. 859 (1954), as authority,
but there the employer, a radio station, did much more than disseminate religion. See note
16 supra. In 1974 the Board had, in its discretion, declined jurisdiction over two small Jewish
school systems. The employer in Board of Jewish Education of Greater Washington, D.C.,
210 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1974), provided religious training to high school students and trained
teachers in Judaism and Hebraic studies. Sessions were conducted during the evenings and
on weekends, were nonprofit, and were "operated for the sole purpose of furthering Jewish
education among the Jewish population in the Greater Washington area." Id. at 1053. Accord,
Association of Hebrew Teachers of Metropolitan Detroit, 210 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1974) (ALJ
opinion). The rationale in these cases, however, indicated that the Board was more persuaded
by the schools' slight impact on commerce than by their completely religious character. see,
e.g., id. at 1058 ("sectarian religious purpose is not a sufficient reason . . .to refrain from
asserting jurisdiction"), Moreover, the schools taught more than just Jewish religion; they
also instructed in language and Hebrew culture.
Comparethe Board's completely religious/religiously associated distinction with the tripartite breakdown of religious institutions in Note, Establishment ClauseAnalysis of Legislative
and AdministrativeAid to Religion, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1175, 1182-83 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Establishment Clause] ("Pervasively religious," as in churches and seminaries;
"materially religious," as in most parochial schools; "collaterally religious," as in churchaffiliated colleges), and with the Supreme Court's distinctions between parochial grade
schools and church-supported universities. E.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)
(church-supported higher education can receive direct federal aid for secular instruction);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) ("pervasively religious" elementary and secondary
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cation based on Christian principles does not lead to a contrary
conclusion. Most religiously associated institutions seek to operate
in conformity with their religious tenets."29
Subsequently, the Board has routinely engaged its regulatory
powers in labor disputes involving parochial school systems in large
urban areas.30 It has persisently rejected churches' claims that such
assertions of power interfere with first amendment rights to freedom
of religion. "Rather", the Board has reasoned, "the Act seeks to
maintain and facilitate the full flow of commerce through the stabilization of labor relations." 3' The Board insists this purpose can be
accomplished with only "minimal intrusion on religious conduct"
and the intrusion is "necessary" to achieve that legitimate govern3
mental purpose. 1
Several implicit, but largely unarticulated, assumptions underlie
the Board's reasoning in deciding to regulate parochial schools.
First, the Board assumes that it can separate the nonsecular activities from the secular operations of the school. Secondly, the Board
has, following Christian Scientists, characterized the schools' religious mission as merely "conduct," to be distinguished from
"belief," and has assumed that the schools are, therefore, entitled
to less (if any?) protection. Thirdly, the Board has taken for granted
that the need to regulate labor relations in parochial schools effects
a compelling state interest. (To date, the Board has characterized
its purpose only in general terms, that is, in terms of stabilizing
schools could not receive state aid for teachers' salaries in secular subjects). See notes 104106 and accompanying text infra.
29. 216 N.L.R.B. at 250.
30. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 227 N.L.R.B. 1178 (1977); Diocese of Ft. Wayne-South
Bend, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1226 (1976); Cardinal Timothy Manning, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1976);
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 220 N.L.R.B. 359 (1975); Roman Catholic Church in the State
of Hawaii, Case No. 37-RC-2081, NLRB Region 537, Honolulu, Hawaii (filed July 18, 1975).
See also Henry M. Hald High School Ass'n., The Sisters of St. Josph, 213 N.L.R.B. 415 (1974)
(1st Amendment claim not made before the Board); Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark,
204 N.L.R.B. 159 (1973).
31. Cardinal Timothy Manning, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1976).
32. Id. at 1218 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) and Christian
Scientists). Simultaneously with its assertion over parochial schools, the Board has extended
its jurisdiction to include other charitable, educational, and nonprofit institutions. E.g.,
Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 224 N.L.R.B. 718 (1976) (nonprofit philanthropic organization); Catholic Charities of Buffalo, 220 N.L.R.B. 9 (1975); Jewish Orphan's Home of S.
Calif., a/k/a Vista del Mar Child Care Serv., 191 N.L.R.B. 32 (1972); First Congregational
Church of Los Angeles, 189 N.L.R.B. 911 (1971) (church-owned-and-operated cemetery);
Shattuck School, 189 N.L.R.B. 886 (1971) (private, nonprofit, in-residence secondary school).
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labor relations generally rather than in church schools specifi33
cally. )
Thus the Board has now firmly established that it has the power
to, and that it should, regulate labor relations in those parochial
schools that are not "completely religious." The test can be taken
literally. As demonstrated, application of this test has clearly resulted in bringing the typical urban parochial school system within
the NLRA's purview. The first amendment and policy implications
of that inclusion are substantial and demand careful consideration.
II.

FIRST AMENDMENT BACKGROUND

As noted above, the first amendment causes a bifurcated treatment of religion. The free exercise clause prohibits unjustified government interference with religious belief and practice, and the establishment clause disallows state attempts to further, discriminate
between, or inhibit particular creeds. This section provides the decisional background on these constitutional proscriptions, a background that is necessary for meaningful appreciation of their impact
on governmental regulation of church schools. To aid clarity, the
case law under each religion clause is developed separately.
A.

The Free Exercise Clause

The free exercise clause guarantees the individual the right to
practice a religion (or no religion) according to dictates of conscience. This unquestionably includes the freedom, which "in the nature of things, is absolute," to believe as one pleases, and to be free
from officially compelled thinking.3 4 Thus, "[g]overnment may
neither compel affirmation of a repugnant belief, nor penalize or
discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold reli33. For a criticism of that characterization and its effect on the first amendment balancing, see notes 46-49 and accompanying text infra.
34. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 218 (1963); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940). When the government attempts to exercise thought,
control in religious matters, both the free exercise and the establishment clause are offended;
the latter precludes government from imposing religious beliefs on citizens, and the free
exercise clause protects the individual's right to believe whatever he/she wants to believe. See,
e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). Compare School Dist. of Abington Township
(establishment clause prohibits Bible readings and prayer in public school), with West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (free exercise clause prohibits compelled
flag allegiances over religious objections).

Government Regulation
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gious views abhorrent to the authorities." 5 Problems arise, however,
when beliefs manifest themselves by conduct that conflicts with
legitimate state interests. In such circumstances, the Supreme
Court has balanced the governmental interest against the individual's first amendment rights. Any state interference with religiously
motivated conduct must be justified by some countervailing legitimate state interest that cannot be furthered by less intrusive
36

means.

Challenges to governmental actions which constrain individuals'
religious beliefs, unattached to conduct, have infrequently reached
the Supreme Court. 37 The Court has invalidated state attempts to
compel children with religious objectives to pledge allegiance to the
flag;3" to require belief in God as a test of office;3 9 to prohibit the
teaching of evolutionary theories of man's origins;40 and to discriminate between citizens or groups, solely on the basis of their religious
beliefs, in the allocation of a public forum.4 "If there is any fixed
star in our constitutional constellation," stated Justice Jackson so
35. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963). See also, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488 (1961); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
36. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 407. See notes 70-76 and accompanying text
infra.
37. The cold war and the McCarthy "Red-scare" era, however, engendered many state
attempts at some form of political thought-control, many of which were challenged and
reached the Supreme Court. The loyalty oath cases offer one example. E.g., Elfbrandt v.
Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Wieman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183 (1952). See also cases cited in notes 38 and 40 infra.
38. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d
636 (2d Cir. 1973); Spence v. Bailey, 465 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1972) (Clark, Ret. J., sitting by
designation) (compulsory ROTC in public school violates free exercise rights of those with
religious objections). But see Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (compulsory ROTC
at state university did not violate free exercise rights of those with religious objections). See
also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (state cannot compel motorist to display state
motto, to which he has religious objections, on his license plate); Russo v. Central School
Dist., No. 1, 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972) (teacher cannot be compelled to salute the flag);
Holden v. Bd. of Educ., 46 N.J. 281, 216 A.2d 387 (1966) (Black Muslim children in public
school could not be forced to salute flag even though their objection could be characterized
as political). See generally Annot., 51 L. Ed. 2d 924 (1977).
39. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). See also McDaniel v. Paty, 98 S. Ct. 1322,
1329-36 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (disqualification of ministers from public office is
an "absolute" violation of first amendment).
40. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). Accord, Daniels v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485
(6th Cir. 1975); Moore v. Gaston County Bd. of Educ., 357 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
See generally Le Clerq, The Monkey Laws and the Public Schools: A Second Consumption,
27 VAND. L. REV. 209 (1974).
41. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
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eloquently in the flag case, "it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein."" Such cases are usually made easy by the
absence of any legitimate or substantial state interest. To control
beliefs cannot be a governmental goal in itself, and the Court has
persistently found such efforts to be an improper means of reaching
some otherwise legitimate state purpose.13 "Penalties" on religious
beliefs have also been said to be "absolutely" prohibited." Indeed,
the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner disallowed a state's denial
of unemployment benefits to an otherwise eligible claimant who had
refused on religious grounds to accept employment requiring Saturday hours. The denial was perceived as a penalty on the woman's
religious beliefs.4 5
However, the Court has not been consistent in its characterization
of what is a "penalty." Braunfeld v. Brown" sustained Sunday Blue
Laws even though the state-compelled Sunday closings created a
substantial competitive disadvantage for individuals whose religion
required them to close on Saturdays also. The Court viewed the
Blue Law as merely a regulation of conduct and an "indirect burden" on religion.47
The belief-conduct distinction is difficult to apply, particularly
when the conduct and belief are so intertwined that prohibiting the
former would seriously disrupt the latter.48 The distinction has been
engaged to legitimize state action that is arguably motivated by
prevailing religious and moral beliefs. The Sunday Blue Law cases
are an example, but decisions sustaining anti-bigamy laws are more
42. West Virginia Bd. of Educ., 319 U.S. at 642.
43. McDaniel v. Paty, 98 S. Ct. 1322, 1336 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring); Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
44. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 402.
45. Id. See also McDaniel v. Paty 98 S. Ct. at 1328 & 1331 (Brennan, J., concurring).
46. 366 U.S. 599 (1961). Justice Brennan contends, however, that Braunfeld was largely
overruled by Sherbert v. Verner, 98 S. Ct. at 1331 n.6.
47. 366 U.S. at 606. But see id. at 611 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. The belief-action distinction has recently been subjected to much criticism from commentators and from some justices and judges. They chiefly complain that it is artificial, that
it has a history of constricting free exercise rights, and that courts too often become preoccupied with characterization and overlook fundamental religious concerns. McDaniel v. Paty,
98 S. Ct. at 1330-32. (Brennan, J., concurring); Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise
Clause, 83 HARv. L. REv. 327 (1969); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and
DoctrinalDevelopment, PartI: The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1381, 1387
(1967). Little, supra note 23, at 67-72. See also Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. N.L.R.B., 559
F.2d 1112, 1120 (7th Cir. 1977) (drew no distinction between belief and action).
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troubling." By characterizing bigamy as "conduct," and thereby
less deserving of judicial protection, the Court long ago legitimized
laws making bigamy a crime. For many Mormons, however, polygamy was an integral and essential element in their religious faith.
The state's interests justifying the law, the Court explained, lay in
protecting public morals and the traditional family unit. Those interests, however, are heavily laden with religious values and overtones, as the Court's opinion in Mormon Church v. United States0
evidenced:
49. Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333
(1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). See also Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95
(1948); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946). The facts in Mormon Church and in
Davis are egregious. In the former, the Court sustained the repeal of the Church's corporate
charter because it promoted polygamous marriages. The effect of the repeal, according to the
Court's curious interpretation of trust law, was to give Congress the power to direct and
control the Church's property holdings. Davis affirmed the conviction of a Mormon for conspiracy to obstruct the administration of territorial law after he had voted in a public election.
Before voting he had taken an oath that he did not "teach, advise, counsel, or encourage"
polygamy. According to the State, his church membership violated that oath and justified
the conviction. The Court reasoned: "Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of all
civilized and Christian countries .... To call their advocacy a tenet of religion is to offend
the common sense of mankind." 133 U.S. at 341-42. One commentator has registered a telling
criticism of Davis:
There is not the slightest hesitation [in Davis] to disparage as unworthy basic Mormon beliefs about polygamy, or to employ the force of law in interfering with the
inplementation of those beliefs. Moreover, the normative assumptions of Field and the
Court he represented are as manifest as they are undefended. The reference to 'the
common sense of mankind' reflects the Jeffersonian belief in a universal common sense
that readily reveals right and wrong action to those who are in their 'right' senses. But
that is a belief, and, so far as this author is concerned, one whose status is anything
but self-evident. The same holds true for Field's convictions that polygamy tends to
'degrade woman and debase man,' and that 'few crimes are more pernicious to the best
interests of society.' Those contentions are true only given the truth of certain more
basic beliefs about what is and what is not valuable for human beings. Considered from
Davis' point of view, the fulfillment of a command of God certainly would not be
regarded as degrading to women or debasing to men.
Little, supra note 23, at 71 (emphasis in original). See also note 50 and accompanying text
infra.
50. 136 U.S. at 49. The Court repeatedly justified its holdings in the Mormon cases by
analogizing polygamy to human sacrifices. Both activities are "conduct" that less civilized
people might claim is religiously motivated. Such analogies, though, avoid the hard inquiries.
Banning human sacrifice can be justified under the state's power to protect individuals from
homicides, but banning polygamy has no such rationale. As the quote above makes clear,
polygamy was proscribed because it conflicted with, and threatened, traditional Christian
beliefs, not because it triggered any independent and legitimate governmental power. The
anti-polygamy laws were primarily directed at the expulsion of one belief and the imposition
of another. To that end, they have been quite successful. The Mormon cases continue to be
good law. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 18-20 (1946); cf. Doe v. Common-
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The organization of a community [such as the Mormon
Church] for the spread and practice of polygamy is, in a measure, a return to barbarism. It is contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity has produced
in the Western world.
Conduct provoked by religious belief is not, however, without any
protection; the state can infringe upon such conduct only if its action can be justified by a sufficiently important state interest. The
appropriate "weight" needed to counterbalance religious rights has
varied. Sherbert v. Verner required the State to show that its action
was necessary to promote a "compelling" state interest.5 While
citing Sherbert, one of the Supreme Court's most important free
exercise cases, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 52 was less specific: "Only a state
interest of the highest order" will be "of sufficient magnitude to
override the interest claiming protection under the free exercise
clause."' 3 Two recent decisions that dealt with conscientious objectors to the military draft laws were even more nebulous, and identified the congressional power to raise armies as merely of a "kind and
weight" sufficient to override free exercise claims. 4 The Court thus
concluded that the government was justified both in providing the
conscientious objector exemption only to applicants who object to
all wars (as opposed to particular wars) and in excluding objectors
from veterans' education benefits.
Determination of the appropriate standard in free exercise cases
has been made more difficult by the Court's occasional acceptance
of insubstantial explanations for state infringements or penalties on
religious practices. For example, the Court sustained Sunday Blue
Laws because of the "neutral" state purpose in setting aside Sunday
for community-wide quiet, rest, and recreation. In one of the Blue
Law cases, Braunfeld v. Brown,55 the Court claimed it should not
wealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), summ. aff'g. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975)
(private consensual homosexual behavior can be criminally punished).
51. 374 U.S. at 406.
52. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
53. Id. at 214. The court in State of Ohio v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750,
771 n.17 (1976), noted Yoder's citation to Sherbert and concluded that "sufficient magnitude" is tantamount to the compelling interest test. Others have viewed "sufficient magnitude" as indicating a "sliding scales" approach. See note 83 and accompanying text infra.
54. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 385 (1974); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437,
461 (1971)..See note 83 and accompanying text infra, concerning a sliding scales interpretation of Johnson, Gillette, and other free exercise cases.
55. 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961). See also notes 46-47 and accompanying text supra.
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strike down, "without the most critical scrutiny," any "indirect
burden" on the exercise of religion. Moreover, the Court applied one
of its most lenient equal protection formulations to the Blue Laws
despite the presence of free exercise and establishment clause
rights." Those rights normally trigger a strict equal protection re57
view.
A series of decisions balancing free exercise and state interests has
maintained that the state's intrusion on religious activities is permissible if the activities "posed some substantial threat to public
safety, peace or order."" Under that rationale, the State has, over
religious objections, prohibited polygamy, 9 prohibited parents from
using their children to sell literature on public sidewalks, 60 and required vaccinations.6 ' At the same time, state interests in maintaining safety, peace, and order have not justified taxes designed to
regulate public sermons" and commercial distribution of religious
literature. 3 Nor have those interests been sufficient to sustain the
conviction of Jehovah Witnesses for distributing anti-Catholic literature and playing a phonograph record of similar import while canvassing a Catholic neighborhood."
These results indicate that the appropriate balancing point between free exercise and state interest has not always been consistent. The "public safety, peace, or order" formulation has proved
to be no more than a catch-phrase, which is not particularly helpful.
Nevertheless, the weight and trend of the Court's holdings and language do evidence an abiding concern for the maintenance of free
exercise rights. The cases have generally posed a substantial,
though vaguely defined, burden for the state to meet when chal56. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Equal protection "is offended
only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's
objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power
despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory determination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." Id.
57. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). See McDaniel
v. Paty, 98 S. Ct. at 1337-38 (White, J., concurring). On the relationship of the religion and
equal protection clauses, see Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449 n.14 (1971); Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
58. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 403.
59. E.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). See notes 49-50 and accompanying text supra.
60. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
61. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
62. Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
63. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
64. Cartwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 17: 291

lenged by free exercise rights and have made the relative weight of
that burden depend upon certain identifiable factors. Thus, consistencies have developed that make the balancing process more predictable and easier to use.
First, the added weight of parental interests in rearing children
places a much heavier burden on the state when it simultaneously
infringes upon those interests and freedom of religion. Wisconsin v.
Yoder 5 is the most recent and primary example. In permitting
Amish parents to withdraw their children from public schools at the
end of eighth grade, in order to complete their preparation "for life"
on the farm and in the home, the Court explained that parental
rights substantially increase the state's burden:
[T]his case involves the fundamental interest of parents, as
contrasted with that of the State, to guide the religious future
and education of their children. The history and culture of
Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children."
Moreover, the Court has considered these interests as compelling
when raised on behalf of parents by a corporation devoted to secular
and religious education. In such a circumstance, Pierce v. Society
of Sisters7 struck down an Oregon statute requiring children to
enroll in a public school. A state can enact compulsory education
laws, but it cannot require parents to subject their children to public
schooling if the parents provide the offspring with an adequate,
alternative education. s
While other decisions have recognized parental rights independently of free exercise claims,"' the confluence of these
"fundamental" rights commands that any governmental intrusion
thereon be justified by a state interest of compelling proportions.
A second, well-accepted aspect of free exercise analysis requires
the state to avoid the infringement if there are less restrictive alternatives available to accomplish the legislative goal.70 Even the
65. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
66. Id. at 232.
67. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
68. Id. at 534-35.
69. E.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923);
State of Ohio v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976). See also Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). But cf. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
70. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963). See generally Note, The Less
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Court's decisions in the Sunday Blue Law cases conceded that a
statute which burdens religious observance is invalid if "the state
may accomplish its [legitimate] purpose by means which do not
impose such a burden."'" The Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut"
would not allow the state to prohibit the dissemination of literature
and ideas when regulation would adequately achieve the government's desire to maintain order. The prohibitory enforcement was
"overbroad" in its reach and had unnecessarily included nonobstructive activities. 73 Similarly, Murdock v. Pennsylvania74 and
Follett v. McCormick 75 held that local governments could not tax
distribution of religious literature when their revenue-raising goals
could be satisfied by taxing nonreligious sources. Sherbert v.
Verner, evidencing a more exacting judicial scrutiny, put the onus
on the state "to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation
would combat [the perceived] abuses [of unemployment compensation benefits] without infringing First Amendments rights."7 6
The third, and perhaps most critical, inquiry in free exercise analysis assesses both the degree to which the individual's rights are
threatened by the state action, and the degree to which the state's
interests are threatened by the exercise of religion. 77 Braunfeld v.
Brown, for example, can be rationalized as a decision in which the
Court viewed the first amendment interests as insubstantial. Chief
Justice Warren emphasized that the Sunday Blue Laws
"impose[d] only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion." To
Restrictive Alternative in ConstitutionalAdjudication: An Analysis, A Justification, and
Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REV. 971 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Less Restrictive
Alternative]. On the impact of alternatives in first amendment cases, see id. at 1011-16;
Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Less DrasticMeans].
71. Bruanfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961). The Braunfeld Court, however, rejected
a viable, less restrictive alternatives argument, that states could enact exemptions of the Blue
Laws for those with religious objections to Saturday commerce. See also Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 493-94 (1960) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting); Less Restrictive Alternative, supra
note 70, at 1015.
72. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
73. Id. at 304, 307-08. See Note, The First Amendment OverbreadthDoctrine, 83 HARV.
L. Rav. 844 (1970); Less Restrictive Alternative, supra note 70, at 1011-13. See also Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
74. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
75. 321 U.S. 573 (1944). See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 n.4 (1961).
76. 374 U.S. at 407. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) ("only those
interests . . . not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of
religion").
77. See authorities cited in note 83 infra.
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strike down such legislation uncautiously, said Warren, "would radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature.""8 Although
one could differ with the Court's assessment of the state and individual interests in Braunfeld,1' there is little dispute that the Court
did not perceive the free exercise rights there as weighty; therefore,
the Court refused to apply a litmus paper compelling interest test. 5
By contrast, the Yoder and Sherbert opinions emphasize that
their facts did not seriously affect any state interest. In Yoder, the
Amish children had already received an adequate base education
and were fully instructed by their elders in the operation of farm and
home. That is, Amish schooling provided an excellent "learning for
life," which Chief Justice Burger identified as education's major
and most appropriate goal.8 ' In Sherbert, neither the husbanding of
revenues nor the prevention of abuse was given much weight as
justification for the state's denying unemployment compensation
benefits because of a refusal to accept a particular job due to religious reasons. Requiring the state to pay benefits in such cases, the
Court reasoned, imposed no great burden on the public coffers."
The third free exercise inquiry-assessing the relative impact of
the state action on religiously provoked conduct and viceversa-has been characterized by some courts and commentators as
creating a "sliding-scale" analysis.13 As the state's imposition on the
individual's interests increases, so does the state's burden of justification. Conversely, as the individual's obstruction of valid state
goals intensifies, the burden on the state decreases. These two factors would interact and adjust the scales in each free exercise case.
Certainly such an analysis is one means for aligning most of the free
78. 366 U.S. at 606. See Less Restrictive Alternative, supra note 70, at 1015-16.
79. McDaniel v. Paty, 98 S. Ct. at 1331 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring); Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. at 614. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. See also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
81. 406 U.S. at 211, 223. See also id. at 240 (White, J., concurring); State of Ohio v.
Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976). The weight of the state interest should
be only that difference between the means that infringe upon free exercise interest and any
available less drastic means. Clark, supra note 48, at 331; Less RestrictiveAlternative, supra
note 70, at 1022-23; Less Drastic Means, supra note 70, at 467.
82. State courts and commentators that have addressed the Sherbert issue generally agree
with the Supreme Court's assessment of the weight of the state's interests. See 374 U.S. at
407-08 n.7 and authorities cited therein.
83. Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. 3164, 3171 (E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 76-279 July 7, 1977);
Giannella, supra note 48, at 1390; Note, The Constitutionality of the 1972 Amendment to
Title VII's Exemption for Religious Organizations, 73 MICH. L. Rav. 538, 544 (1975); Free
Exercise Clause, supra note 8, at 637, 666.
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exercise decisions into some consistent pattern, and it could explain
the rather nebulous statements in Yoder and the draft cases that the
state interest must be of "sufficient magnitude" or of some unarticulated "kind and weight." However characterized, the assessments
made in this third inquiry have been of undeniable importance to
the Court's decisions.
Finally, in determining whether free exercise interests are threatened, the Court will examine both the "purpose and effect" of the
challenged state action." If the government, by either design or
unintended result, either impedes observance of one or all religions,
or discriminates between them, then it must justify the impediment
under the free exercise balancing test. 85 Most free exercise cases
involve challenges to facially neutral state actions that have the
effect of restricting religious conduct.
As soon as an inhibitory purpose or effect is identified, the Court
will balance. While some ambiguity persists regarding the precise
wording of the free exercise "test," the Court's balancing has emphasized these factors:
1. The combination of religious and parental rights increases
the burden on the state;
2. The existence of less restrictive alternatives increases the
burden on the state;
3. The degree of governmental intrusion on the first amendment rights must be weighed along with the degree to which
the state interests are, in fact, jeopardized by the exercise of
religion;
4. The state interest should be "of the highest order" unless
the burden on religion is slight.
B.

The Establishment Clause

The constitutional prohibition against governmental action respecting the establishment of religion has only recently received
extensive Supreme Court illumination." Several social and legal
84. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 404; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940).
85. In such circumstances, the free exercise and establishment clauses work together to
demand justification from the government for its de facto and de jure discrimination. See
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 394 U.S. 398, 404 (1963);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). See notes 90-102 and accompanying text infra.
86. The Supreme Court, prior to 1947, gave only very infrequent and limited exposure to
the establishment clause. See Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908); Bradfield v. Roberts,
175 U.S. 291 (1899); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871); Terrett v. Taylor, 13
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developments have, however, coalesced in the past thirty years to
give the establishment clause substance and meaning. 7 The Court's
decisions have usually focused upon the nation's schools. "[Tiwo
general categories of cases may be identified: those dealing with
religious activities within the public schools, and those involving
public aid in varying forms to sectarian educational institutions."88
Hard financial times in parochial schools and more liberal standing
rules have made the second set of cases the most predominant in
the development of establishment clause doctrine. The issues in
those cases continue to perplex the courts.89
The Court has developed a tripartite analysis for establishment
clause challenges that has proved easy to state but difficult to
apply. In reviewing state statutes conferring aid to parochial schools
for use in nonsectarian subjects, the Court distilled this test: 0
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815). In 1947, the Court applied the clause to the states through the
14th amendment due process clause, thus facilitating constitutional review of numerous state
programs in the ensuing decades. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Like the free exercise clause, the establishment clause is rooted in our Colonial experience,
particularly in Virginia; and Jefferson and Madison heavily influenced the drafting and
subsequent interpretations. The antecedent of the clause was Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance, which he wrote to attack a bill that had been introduced by Patrick Henry in
the 1784 Virginia General Assembly. Henry's legislation would have assessed a tax on Virginia
citizens to support teachers of the Christian religion. Each individual taxed could have
designated the church that should receive the government-collected benefit. Madison's
fifteen-point response spearheaded defeat of the bill and provided the foundation for passage
of Thomas Jefferson's Bill for EstablishingReligious Freedom. These documents then form
the basis for the religious provisions in the first amendment. See PEARL v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 770 n.28 (1973). The Bill and the Memorial and Remonstrance are reprinted as appendices to Justice Douglas's dissent in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), and to Justice
Rutledge's dissent in Everson.
87. The major legal development was the court's liberalization of standing requirements
to permit taxpayer challenges to governmental financial support of sectarian schools. Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The significant social development lay in the hard times
encountered by parochial schools and the corresponding efforts by the states to help them.
See generally L. PPEFFER, GOD, CAESAR AND CONsTrruION (1975); Louisell, Does the Constitution Require a Purely Secular Society?, 26 CATH. U.L. REv. 20 (1976).
88. PEARL v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772 (1973). For a review of sample cases, see id. and
notes 29-30 supra.
89. E.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Public Funds for Public Schools of N.J.
v. Byrne, 444 F.Supp. 1228 (D.N.J. 1978).
90. Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 748 (1976); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The stated criteria for the establishment clause analysis are to
be viewed as guidelines, not as rigid limitations. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973);
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971); Zoetewey, Excessive Entanglement: Development of a Guideline for Assessing Acceptable Church-State Relationships, 3 PEPPERDINE L.
REv. 279, 295, 298 (1976).
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its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion . . . ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Each of these
requires separate discussion.
Ascertaining legislative purpose is a difficult task, due to the
inherent difficulties in identifying some communal motive among
scores of legislators." In striking down Arkansas's "Monkey Law"
and in banning compulsory prayer and Bible readings in public
schools, the Court could confidently identify a sectarian purpose. 2
Few other cases, however, have presented determinable illicit motives that clearly had moved the legislature. Certainly, in most any
case involving administrative regulation (except discriminatory enforcement), the state operates with a valid, secular purpose. Recently, the Court has accepted at face value the legislatures' purposes as stated in the statutory preambles and has focused instead
on the "effect" and "entanglement" factors of its establishment
3
clause analysis.
Determinations of the validity of a statute's effects and its entanglement with religion invariably present questions of degree. 4 For
that reason, the separation of church and state has become "a
blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the cir5
cumstances of a particular relationship."
The overwhelming proportion of cases that have been concerned
with the establishment clause effects of government action has involved public aid to parochial schools. To prevent improper effects
in such cases, the Court has tried to maintain the working premise
that a state may not "pay for what is actually a religious education,
even though it purports to be paying for a secular one, and even
though it makes its aid available to secular and religious institutions
alike."" Again, however, the premise is more easily stated than
applied. Church schools can and do receive public aid for bus transportation, therapeutic services, and secular textbooks, but not for
91. See generally Brest, Palmerv. Thompson: An Approach to the Problemsof Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative
Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALz L.J. 1205 (1970).
92. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
93. E.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
613 (1971). See Establishment Clause, supra note 28, at 1175, 1179, 1192.
94. E.g., Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
314 (1952); Zoetewey, supra note 90, at 283.
95. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 236, quoting Lemon v. Kurtman, 403 U.S.at 614.
96. Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976).
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teachers, field trips, and instructional materials and equipment. 7
At first glance, the dividing line would seem to lie between those
items and services inherently neutral and those "inextricably connected""8 with a school's religious function.
Further consideration reveals that the dividing line is not so clear.
The public provision of ostensibly neutral and secular materials
could still have the "primary effect of providing a direct and substantial advancement of the sectarian enterprise."9 9 The Court has
concluded that it is impossible to separate "the secular education
function from the sectarian" in parochial primary and secondary
schools, and that the state aid thus inevitably flows in part to
support the schools' religious role. 0° In keeping with that conclusion, the Court has permitted aid through high school grades only
in those matters wholly separate from or outside the educative process, except for the anomaly of textbook provisions.'
The parochial school cases, of course, are examples of official
efforts to advance religion. The establishment clause can also be
97. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (therapeutic services and textbooks valid; field
trips and instructional materials and equipment invalid); Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975) (textbooks valid; auxiliary and remedial instruction invalid); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971) (teacher invalid); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (textbooks
valid); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (bus transportation valid).
98. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 251 n.17. See also id. at 259 (Marshall, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (the line for government funds to parochial schools should be
drawn between allocations for general welfare programs, which would be permissible, and
support for eductional assistance, which would be invalid).
One commentator has suggested that the "effects" test depends upon a two -stage factor
analysis. "The first state examines the religious permeation of the recipient institution. The
second stages weith the severability of the government aid from the religious component of
the recipient institution ....
Establishment Clause, supra note 28, at 1182-86.
99. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 250. See also Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. at 366.
100. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 250.
101. Most of the evils inherent in aid to parochial schools for teachers and other educational expenses exist in state money for textbooks. The difficulty in distinguishing secular
from religious and the potential for fostering political divisiveness, church dependence on
state funds, and misuse of materials are substantial in the textbook programs. See Freund,
Public Aid to ParochialSchools, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1680, 1683, 1685-86, 1688-92 (1969). The
Court has virtually admitted as much in striking down state provisions for parochial instructional materials and equipment. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 248-51; Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349 (1975). Yet the Court continues to adhere to its holding in Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), allowing aid for textbooks. Wolman, supra; Meek, supra. Justice
Marshall has urged that Allen and that portion of Meek concerning the books should be
overruled. Wolman, supra, at 257-59 (dissenting opinion). Commentators have critically
noted this anomalous toleration of the textbook aid. E.g., Freund, supra; Nowak, The Supreme Court, The Religion Clauses, and the Nationalization of Education, 70 Nw. L. REv.
883, 890-91 (1976); Comment, 16 DuQ. L. REv. 253, 265 (1977).
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engaged when governmental muscle is used either to inhibit religion
or to discriminate among religions. Generally speaking, the state
cannot substantially aid or impede an institution's sectarian functions. 02
The third prong of the establishment clause test-that excessive
government-church entanglement is unconstitutional-is an outgrowth of the "primary effect" inquiry. Certainly, the entangling
interaction between state and church is a consequence, or "effect,"
of the challenged state action.'
To determine excessive entanglement, the Court explores four
subjects:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The
The
The
The

character of the affected institution;
nature of the aid or impediment;
resulting relationship between church and state;
resulting political divisiveness.0'4

The ensuing discussion addresses these subjects in that order.
As in cases examining state action's "effects," the entanglement
decisions have usually focused upon some level of parochial school,
either elementary school, high school, or college. The Court has
allowed legislatures much more latitude in aiding religiously affiliated universities than private and secondary church schools., 5 The
colleges-at least those that are not seminary schools-are generally
less pervasively religious, have fewer required religious functions
and classes, and have less impressionable students than the primary
and secondary schools. Churches consider the colleges to be less
significant to the propagation and continuation of their beliefs. Finally, the colleges are much more likely to have a lower percentage
102. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559
F.2d at 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1231 (1978); Giannella, supra note 48, at
1387-89; Establishment Clause, supra note 28; Note, Toward a ConstitutionalDefinition of
Religion, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1056, 1063-64 n.51 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional
Definition].
103. Waz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 674. There is a great deal of overlap in the analysis
for establishment clause "effects" and "entanglement." Establishment Clause,supra note 28,
at 1182-83, 1186-87. This lack of delineation is not particularly critical, however, given the
Court's consideration and weighing of all relevant circumstances in its establishment clause
cases.
104. Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U.S. at 748-49; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. at 615, 622.
105. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 748-49; Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899); Establishment Clause,
supra note 28, at 1182-83.
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of students who are members or followers of the sponsor church. In
contrast, the courts have described the conditions and atmosphere
in parochial elementary and high schools as pervasively religious;
and any aid given to such schools has received strict judicial scru6
0

tiny.'

As the Court's distinction between colleges and grade schools attests, the significance of the institution in entanglement analysis
lies in the extent of its involvement in, and commitment to, religious activities and propagation. The more commercial, or the more
diversified, the institution is, the more government is able to become involved with it.
The nature of the government aid or impediment to religion is the
second consideration in determining entanglement. The inquiry focuses on the degree to which the aid or imposition is intertwined
with the religious efforts of the church. For example, fire protection
and inspections, police protection, bus transporation for students,
and therapeutic and medical services are ascertainably neutral and
separable from the churches' religious mission. They create little
entanglement and have been found to be permissible. 07
The legislatures in Lemon v. Kurtzman,'0 however, wanted to
help the church schools pay teachers' salaries, presumably for some
portion of the secular instruction that the teachers provided. The
Supreme Court was unobliging: even assuming the instructors' good
faith, the pervasively religious setting and the teachers' religious
training and beliefs would naturally influence the faculty to instill
those beliefs in others. The government had no way, beyond gross
and entangling surveillance tactics, either to predict the ability of
particular teachers to convey a particular subject matter
"neutrally", or to ascertain whether a teacher is, in fact, neutral in
his classroom presentations. Public funding for parochial school
teachers so intimately involved government with the institutions'
religious mission that it generated excessive and illicit entanglement.10
106. E.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615-16, 620 (1971); Catholic Bishop of
Chicago v. N.L.R.B., 559 F.2d 1112, 1114 n.5 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 2131
(1978). See also authorities cited in Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616 n.6.
107. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947);
Freund, supra note 101, at 1691-92.
108. 403 U.S. 601 (1971).
109. Id. at 617. See also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 372 n.22; Freund, supra note 101,
at 1688-89.
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The third, and probably the most critical, element in entanglement analysis examines the scope, nature, and duration of the
church-state relationship which results from the extension of governmental aid or regulation. Naturally, the more involved and pervasive the government regulation becomes in the church's operations, the greater the entanglement. The point at which the entanglement reaches "excessive" is a question of degree and is often
difficult to determine." 0 The intrusive impact, or the extent to
which the state's activities disrupt decision-making and operation
of church schools, controls.
The Court has identified certain governmental activities that are
particularly suspect. For example, the subsidization of teachers'
salaries, as in Lemon, would require constant governmental surveillance of classrooms to insure that public money was not being diverted to sectarian instruction."' Such surveillance would be highly
offensive to our concept of church-state separation. Regular and
extended inspections of church records have also been found to con2
stitute excessive entanglement."
At times, the establishment clause may require the state to accord special treatment to churches in order to avoid more entangling
relationships. 113 The Court so intimated in Walz v. Tax
Commission,' its first recognition of entanglement as a separate
inquiry. Walz rejected a challenge to the long-standing tradition of
providing property tax exemptions for churches. The exemptions
may be compelled by the establishment clause because they create
110.

Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 674; Zoetewey, supra note 90, at 283.
111. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 619-20. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 244;
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 674.
112. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. at 746; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 620; Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 674.
113. Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U.S. at 748 n.15:
The importance of avoiding persistent and potentially frictional contact between
governmental and religious authorities is such that it has been held to justify the
extension, rather than the withholding, of certain benefits to religious organizations.
The Court upheld the exemption of such organizations from property taxation partly
on this ground. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674-675 (1970).
The free exercise clause enables government to facilitate religious development by the
granting of exemptions for religious organizations or conduct, yet remain within the establishment clause. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (exemption for Amish from
compulsory school attendance); Dodge, The Free Exercise of Religion: A Sociological
Approach, 67 MICH. L. REv. 679, 705-06 (1969); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and DoctrinalDevelopment, Part II, The NonestablishmentPrinciple,81 HARV. L. REV.
513 (1968); Establishment Clause, supra note 93, at 1176 n.7.
114. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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less church-state contact than would assessment of taxes and they
are more nearly neutral. Imposing the taxes would require periodic
(probably annual) collections and would "giv[e] rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct
confrontations and conflicts that follow in the train of those legal
processes.""'
The last of the four entanglement inquiries examines the political
divisiveness that the challenged state action is likely to engender.
Historically the presence of government in subsidizing or compelling religion has produced emotional, bitter, and divisive factioning
and disruption. "This was 'one of the principal evils against which
the First Amendment was intended to protect.'""" In the recent
school cases, the Court has assessed the government aid to church
primary and secondary schools as substantially divisive. The geographical concentration of students, the essentially Catholic/antiCatholic line drawing (with its ethnic overtones) that often results,
and the schools' close ties to the church all aggravate the potentiality for political turmoil." 7
Entanglement analysis is intended to scrupulously enforce the
first amendment requirement for governmental neutrality toward
religion. To accomplish that goal, the Court has been careful to
avoid not ony presently-manifested entanglements, but also the
potential for conflict. For example, the Lemon Court expressed
skepticism that church school teachers with religious training and
beliefs could adequately separate their faith from their teaching.
Even though the Court assumed the teachers' good intentions, and
there was nothing on the record to evidence abuse, the "potential
115. Id. at 674. See also id. at 698-99 (Harlan, J., concurring). The tax exemptions for
churches support the establishment clause policy of "mutual abstention-keeping politics out
of religion and religion out of politics." Freund, supra note 101, at 1686.
116. Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd, 426 U.S. at 749, quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 622. See the authorities collected in Roemer, 426 U.S. at 749-50 n.16. Justice
Harlan, concurring in Walz, claimed that preventing political divisiveness along sectarian
lines was a major purpose of the establishment clause. 397 U.S. at 695.
117. See Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U.S. at 765. The political divisiveness inquiry in establishment clause analysis has received criticism because it is difficult to
evaluate and apply. See Nowak, supra note 101, at 906-07; EstablishmentClause, supra note
93, at 1189; Note, The Sacred Wall, 67 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 118 (1972); Comment, 86 HARv. L. REv.
1068, 1101-02 (1973). Such difficulties may explain why the Court has not developed or relied
upon the political divisiveness test in its recent decisions. E.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229 (1977); Roemer, supra. The Court has admitted that the test should merely be regarded
as an important "warning signal," but not as an independent means for invalidation. PEARL
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797-98 (1973).
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for impermissible fostering of religion" was such that state subsidization of the teachers' salaries was invalidated.118 In Meek v.
Pittinger,
"19 the Court perceived a similar, though reduced, undesirable potential in a provision for teachers who were publicly paid and
employed to instruct remedial and exceptional students in the
church schools. The presence of the auxiliary teachers had the
"potential for provoking controversy between the Commonwealth
and religious authorities over the extent of the teachers' responsibilities and the meaning of the legislative and administrative restrictions on the content of their instruction."' 20 Levitt v. Committee for
Public Education2 1 expressed the same concerns while striking
down public funding of teacher-prepared tests. A "substantial risk"
existed that the tests could be used as2 2tools for inculcation of the
sponsoring church's religious precepts.
The Court has, in these instances as well as in others, recognized
that church-state entanglement leads to a very slippery slope, and
that any ventures onto it must be cautiously made. The distinctions
made in establishment clause analysis are so fine that a slight misstep could set in motion a governmental snowball capable of crushing religious independence."'
III.

APPLICATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT LAW TO

NLRB

REGULATION

OF PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS

A.

Overview of Analysis

Governmental regulation of church schools triggers both free exercise and establishment clause considerations. Regulatory intrusions
into the parochial education of youth raise free exercise issues and
therefore, must be justified by some sufficient state interest. Establishment clause questions are presented by governmental regulation
that, as the schools will argue, preempts private decision-making in
religious matters, involves government in church business and instructional functions, and pits government's power against the
118. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 601, 619 (1971).
119. 421 U.S. 349, 370-71 (1975).
120. Id. at 372 n.22.
121. 413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973).
122. Id. at 480. See also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
123, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624 (1971); "A certain momentum develops in
constitutional theory and it can be a 'downhill thrust' easily set in motion but difficult to
retard or stop." Id. See also note 258 and accompanying text infra.
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churches' efforts to establish, maintain, and advance their religion.
As explained in Part II-A, free exercise analysis requires a determination of whether or not the purpose or effect of state action
inhibits or penalizes the practice of a religion. If there is an impediment, then a reviewing court must balance the degree of governmental intrusion on parental and religious interests against the
degree to which the intrusion is necessary to achieve a legitimate
state purpose. The degree of necessity must be of the highest order
to outweigh the free exercise concerns.
In NLRB cases, the degree of infringement on first amendment
rights must be determined by examining the religious character of
the regulated institution and of the relevant employees' unit (here,
teachers), and the nature and extent of the governmental intrusion,
including the government's resulting relationship with the institution. The infringement on a religion ensues from the inhibitory effects and government-church entanglement caused by the regulatory scheme. In regulatory cases, then, the free exercise claim
largely depends upon the same analysis as is applied to the establishment clause issues. The context is analogous to that described
by the Court in Walz v. Tax Commission; the gross and potentially
unlawful church-state interaction that would accompany tax revenue collections from churches could create excessive entanglement
21 4
offensive to both the free exercise and establishment clauses.

There is no question that the church and parental rights involved
in the operation of a parochial school at least raise free exercise
claims to a degree sufficient to set in motion the balancing process. 125 The analysis here will thus focus on the inhibitory effects of
NLRB regulation and on its potential for spawning excessive
church-state entanglement. The discussion will also consider, as it
must, the government's countervailing rationales for needing the
regulation.
124. 397 U.S. at 674-75. See also Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U.S. 726,
748 n.15 (1976). Thus the free exercise and establishment clauses overlap in regulatory cases,
and operation of each facilitates operation of the other. See authorities cited in notes 85, 102,
& 113 supra.
125. Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted,
98 S. Ct. 1231 (1978); Free Exercise Clause, supra note 8, at 641-42. Certainly, the Supreme
Court's parochiad decisions noting the religious permeation of Catholic schools would dictate
that religious interests are at least affected by the NLRB regulation. E.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615-16 (1971). Wisconsin v. Yoder, 403 U.S. 205 (1972), recognized free
exercise rights in mixed religious and practical training. The Board has also assumed that
first amendment rights are implicated so that some balancing is required. E.g., Cardinal
Timothy Manning, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1976).
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B.

Purpose and Effect

The NLRB does have legitimate reasons for extending its jurisdiction to include church school employers. Unquestionably, labor organizing has reached the nation's schools. 26 The Board is alert for
spawning grounds of labor unrest. The Board's decisions reaching
the schools have expressed concern for the harmful impact on commerce that could result from such strife and sympathy for the organizational rights of parochial school teachers.'2 There has been no
intimation that the Board's reasons for regulating the schools include any anti-religious sentiments or motives.'2
The effects of NLRB jurisdiction on an employer are substantial,
and those effects manifest themselves in several ways. Certainly one
consequence is greatly increased operating costs.D If covered by the
Act, parochial schools will also experience changes in employeremployee relations and attitudes,1ss in disclosure of information requirements, 13' in some decision-making procedures, and in the hierarchical structure between administration and faculty.' 3 The procedural changes are, in turn, likely to affect substantive policy.,1
These effects will be examined here to determine their scope and the
degree to which they are likely to inhibit religion.
NLRB regulation will significantly increase the expenses of parochial schools.' 3' Government regulation and coordinate enforce126. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 18, at 254-55; Kahn, The NLRB and HigherEducation:
The Failureof Policymaking Through Adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 63, 64 (1973); Special
Project, Educationand the Law: State Interests and IndividualRights, 74 MIcH. L. REV. 1373,
1498-1502 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Michigan Project].
127. See Cardinal Timothy Manning, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1976).
128. But see Hubbell, supra note 3; Louisell, supra note 87; Serritella, supra note 8, at
326-30. Mr. Hubell, in particular, suggests that several recent legislative, administrative, and
judicial decisions evidence an overt anti-Catholic bias.
129. See notes 134-143 and accompanying text infra.
130. See notes 144-148 and accompanying text infra.
131. See notes 149-155 and accompanying text infra.
132. The impact of the Act on decision-making and hierarchy is discussed in text accompanying notes 171-198 infra. See note 133 infra.
133. See text accompanying notes 171-198 infra. Entanglement is a consequence. As noted
in note 103 supra, there is a great deal of overlap between analysis of effects and of entanglement. Thus much that is discussed under "entanglement" could also be seen as creating
unconstitutional effects.
134. Brown, Collective Bargaining in Higher Education, 67 Micti. L. Rv. 1067, 1069
(1969 (AFT primary aims are increased salaries and decreased workloads); Bucklew,
Collective Bargainingin HigherEducation:Its FiscalImplications,57 LIBERAL ED. 255 (1970);
Kahn, supra note 126, at 83; Klaus, The Evolution of a Collective BargainingRelationship
in Public Education: New York City's ChangingSeven-Year History, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1033
(1969).
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ment powers enhance employees' bargaining power which, in turn,
will increase payroll and employee benefit costs through both higher
wages and additional personnel.' 5
Moreover, the expenses of collective bargaining are substantial. 3'
Schools will be forced either to devote their own administrative
personnel's time to bargaining or to hire outside negotiators. Either
alternative has its costs, 37 and they are likely to escalate when the
federal government oversees the bargaining and enforces the rules.
Employees' time spent complying with many of those rules further
inflates the price of being subjected to NLRB regulation.
In addition, of course, legal fees accompany NLRB regulation.
The schools will need lawyers for effective representation in the
almost inevitable unfair labor practice and certification proceedings. Appeals to federal circuit court and section 10 court appearances may also follow. 38 The breadth and detail of federal labor laws
and regulations require employers to consult regularly with their
attorneys. 9 Needless to say, such representation and counseling
cost money.
Finally, if the NLRB can regulate parochial schools, then so can
other federal and state agencies.4 0 Compliance and legal costs attend those assertions of regulatory power, and further dwindle the
schools' resources.
The parochial schools and their patrons can appropriately ask
how they can be ineligible for any form of direct financial assistance,
which they badly need, and yet be subject to costly and intricate
government regulation. Admittedly, ineligibility for benefits should
not necessarily mean relief from responsibility. Nevertheless, it
135. Catholic Biship of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1123-24 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 1231 (1978); Brown, supra note 134, at 1075; Brown, supra note 18, at 326;
Serritella, supra note 8, at 327-28; Michigan Special Project, supra note 126, at 1499; Note,
Teacher Collective Bargaining-Who Runs the Schools?, 2 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 505, 508, 559
n.307 (1974).
136. Serritella, supra note 8. Not only do employers have to bear the expense for their
own preparation for, and participation in, collective bargaining, but they could also end up
underwriting the employees' bargaining unit's manpower time. Axelson, Inc., 97 L.R.R.M.
1234 (1978) (employer had mandatory duty to bargain over pay for members of union's
collective bargaining committee).
137. Cook & Doering, Negotiating a Teachers' Contract: The Time Commitment for
Bilateralism, 32 ARB. J. 145 (1977).
138. N.L.R.A. §§ 8-10, 29 U.S.C. § 158-160 (1970). See text accompanying notes 200-208
infra.
139. Serritella,supra note 8, at 322, 331.
140. Hubbell, supra note 3. See PEARL v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797 n.56 (1973); note
123 and accompanying text supra; note 258 and accompanying text infra.
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seems basically unfair to impose governmental regulation and its
attendant drain on resources without providing a fair slice of governmental largesse. There is also a doctrinal inconsistency; preventing
government dollars from compromising churches on matters of religious education was a major theme in the parochial opinions. With
governmental money comes governmental regulation, the Justices
reasoned."' Now, the NLRB wishes to assert governmental regulation even though the financial assistance has been largely severed.
While invalidating NLRB regulation of parochial schools, the Seventh Circuit recently noted the cruel whip-sawing effect of the
Board's policy,4 2 and relied upon a fairness rationale in reaching its

decision: "1
A church which chooses to educate its own young people in
schools which it is required essentially to finance without governmental aid should because of the essentially religious permeation of its curriculum be equally freed of the obviously
inhibiting effect and impact of the restrictions of the National
Labor Relations Act in conducting the teaching program of
those schools.
In addition to the fiscal problems created by Board jurisdiction,
the church schools are likely to experience a different relationship
with their employees. Undeniably, the NLRA is aimed at adjusting
that relationship by, among other means, providing employees with
government-enforced clout. The schools would lose most of their
ability to deal with employees individually; with NLRB backing,
unions have obtained blanket provisions for promotions, termination grounds, and other important elements."' Union members have
141. Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 772 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id., at 775 (Stevens., J., dissenting); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1976);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620-21 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675
(1970); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1947)(Jackson, J., dissenting). See also
PEARL v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788-89 (1973); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 259-60 (1963)(Brennan, J., concurring); Freund, supra note 101, at 1685-86; note 279 and
accompanying text infra.
142. Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1119 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 1231 (1978).
143. Id. at 1130. See also id. at 1119.
144. E.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 745-47 (1962); National Licorice Co. v. NLRB,
309 U.S. 350 (1940); United States Gypsum Co., 155 N.L.R.B. No. 118 (1965), enf. denied
on other gmds., 393 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1968); United States Gypsum Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 112,
amended 97 N.L.R.B. 889 (1951), modified on other grnds., 206 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1953);
Kahn, supra note 126, at 80 n.61; McHugh, Collective Bargaining with Professionals in
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the right to representation by union officials during meetings and
disciplinary sessions with employers.'4 5 The union is a persistent
buffer between schools and employees. A more obvious adversarial
relationship results.'11
Employee relations are also likely to be strained by disputes between the schools and faculty and among the teachers over the
status of church-trained staff in the collective bargaining unit. For
example, two-thirds of the teachers in the Rhode Island Catholic
schools described in Lemon v. Kurtzman were nuns or priests.' 7 The
Board has already decided a number of cases involving clerics' participation in the bargaining unit."18 Naturally, the lay faculty want
the clerics excluded because the latter do not have families and are
not as likely to be aggressive on economic issues. The schools want
the church-trained people included because they are more likely to
represent the church's viewpoints within the union structure.
The NLRA would further affect the parochial schools by compelling them to disclose information in a number of circumstances.
First, the schools would be subject to Board perusal of their financial data to determine jurisdictional status.' 4 Secondly, under section 11 of the Act, the Board is entitled to access to "any evidence
. . .that relates to any matter under investigation or in question."'" Those are broadly-stated investigatory powers, and they
have received an elastic judicial interpretation."' Thirdly, parties in
HigherEducation, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 55, 71-72. See generally GORMAN,supra note 14, at 50306; 5 T. KHEEL, LABOR LAw §§ 19.07, 20.03(4)-(6) (1974). This aspect is discussed more fully
in text accompanying notes 171-198 infra.
145. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251 (1975); Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Div.,
168 N.L.R.B. 361 (1967).
146. Brown, supra note 18, at 270; Michigan Project, supra note 126, at 1498-1502. See
also Wollett, The Coming Revolution in Public School Management, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1017,
1031-32 (1969).
147. 403 U.S. at 65.
148. St. Francis College, 224 N.L.R.B. 907, enf. denied, 562 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1977);
Seton Hill College, 201 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1973).
149. NLRA § .9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970); NLRB, Statements of Procedure, §§
101.18(a), 101.4. See 2 T. KHEEL, supra note 144, at §§ 7.01(3), 7.02(4).
150. 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1970). Subsection (1) states:
The Board, or its duly authorized agents or agencies, shall at all reasonable times have
access to, for the purpose of examination, and the right to copy any evidence of any
person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to any matter under investigation or in question.
Id. § 161(1).
For implementation of § 11, see generally 29 C.F.R. §§ 101-03 (1977). Free Exercise, supra
note 8,at 661-62 n.157 , catalogues the relevant regulations.
151. E.g., NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. 759 (1969). See 29 C.F.R. §§ 101-03 (1977);
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Board proceedings can use the Board's compulsory process to extract a wide range of information from other interested parties. 52
Finally, in order to satisfy its duty to bargain in good faith, the
parochial schools would be required to disclose any and all information relating to their bargaining positions.'5 3 If, for example, the
schools contend that budget restraints preclude a sought-for salary
increase, then they must open their books for inspection or be subjected to a Board finding of an unfair labor practice.' 4
With secular employers, such intrusions into records and motives
are condoned as necessary to preserve peaceful industrial and economic conditions and to protect employees' rights. When the employer, however, is a religious institution that is not asserting itself
in a commercial enterprise, the intrusion is more at odds with our
conceptions of legitimate governmental inquiry. 5 '
The cumulation of these effects would substantially inhibit the
operations of parochial schools. The effects would produce a detrimental impact on the schools' budgets, on their efficiency, and on
their autonomous character.
C.
1.

Entanglement

Character of the Institution

The propriety of government regulation in many instances can
Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. 3164, 3173-74 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Free Exercise Clause, supra
note 8, at 661-62 n.157.
152. NLRA § 11(1), 29 U.S.C. § 161(1):
The Board, or any member thereof, shall upon application of any party to [Boardi
proceedings, forthwith issue to such party subpenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of witnesses or the production of any evidence in such proceedings or investigation requested in such application.
Subsections (2) and (3) provide enforcement mechanisms for the production of evidence and
appearance of witnesses. 29 U.S.C. § 161(2)(3) (1970).
153. NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5); NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432
(1967); NLRB v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 352 U.S. 938 (1956); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351
U.S. 149, 152-53 (1956); Boston-Herald-Traveler Corp. v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 58 (lst Cir. 1955);
NLRB v. Item Co., 220 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1955); GORMAN, supra note 14, at 409-15; 4 T.
KHEEL, supra note 144, § 16.04(8).
154. E.g., NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); NLRB v. Bagal Bakers Council
of Greater N.Y., 434 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1970); United Steelworkers of Am., Local 5571 v.
NLRB, 401 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 946 (1969); NLRB v. Western
Wirebound Box Co., 356 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1966).
155. The "effects" of the Board's investigatory and subpoena powers tie in closely with
the church-government "resulting relationship" discussed in text accompanying notes 199208 infra.
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depend upon the religious character of the subject institution.,'" The
determinative inquiry ascertains the degrees to which the institution and (at least in NLRB cases) the employees' unit are engaged
in religious purposes and activities. Thus a church-supported hospital may legitimately be subjected to extensive regulation, "7 but a
church charity that serves evangelistic ends may be beyond most
public scrutiny.'5 8 Similarly, the NLRB can assert itself over carpenters and plumbers in a church publishing house,' 59 but that same
employer's religious writers and editors may be beyond the Board's
reach.1i0
The Supreme Court has characterized parochial schools as permeated with religious instruction and purposes.'' Value transference and inculcation are their raison d' etre.'12 For example, the
Rhode Island church schools in Lemon v. Kurtzman"3 were located
close to parish churches, thus facilitating convenient access for religious exercises in faith and morals. The schools contained many
icons and paintings of religious import. Thirty minutes of each day
were devoted to direct religious instruction, and there were also
religiously-oriented extracurricular activities. Approximately twothirds of the teachers in the schools were nuns. These and other facts
prompted a district court finding that the schools constituted "an
integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic Church," and
"a powerful vehicle for transmitting the Catholic faith."'' 4 The Su156. Establishment Clause, supra note 93, at 1182-83; notes 105-106 and accompanying
text supra. Compare Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (government aid to parochial
grade schools invalidated), with Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (government aid
to church-related colleges and universities sustained).
157. See Schulte, Union Organization in Catholic Hospitals, 21 CATH. LAW 332 (1975).
158. Cf. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972); Lutheran Church
Synod, 109 N.L.R.B. 859 (1954); But see Catholic Charities of Buffalo, 220 N.L.R.B. 9 (1975);
Lutheran Welfare Services of Illinois, 216 N.L.R.B. No. 96 (1975).
159. First Church of Christ Scientist, 194 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1972).
160. Compare McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972) (Title VII does
not reach church-minister relationship), with Marshall v. Pacific Union Conf. of Seventh Day
Adventist, No. 75-3032-R (C.D. Calif. March 23, 1977) (FLSA equal pay provision applies to
lay employees at church educational institutions). But see N.L.R.B. v. Associated Press, 301
U.S. 103 (1937).
161. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 366, 371; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 685-88;
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 613-18; notes 105-106 and accompanying text supra.
162. Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1118-23 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 1231 (1978).
163. 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971). See also J. FICHTER, PAROCHIAL SCHOOL: A SOCIOLOGICAL
STUDY 77-108 (1958); Giannella, supra note 113, at 574.
164. 403 U.S. at 616.
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preme Court thus assumed in Lemon, as it has in each subsequent
case involving elementary and secondary church schools, that those
schools have, as a central purpose, the inculcation of religious values
and beliefs and that purpose permeates the schools' operation
and instruction.
The churches have explicitly expressed their goals. The Vatican,
for example, has decreed that "the Church is bound to give those
children of hers the kind of education through which their entire
lives can be penetrated with the spirit of Christ.""' 5 In a 1972 pastoral letter, the American Bishops described the religious mission of
Catholic schools in this country:' 6
[T]he educational efforts of the church must encompass the
twin purposes of personal sanctification and social reform in
light of Christian values.
Only in such a school can [students] experience learning and
living fully integrated in the light of faith. The Catholic school
'strives to relate all human culture eventually to the news of
salvation, so that the life of faith will illumine the knowledge
which students gradually gain of the world, of life, and of mankind' . . . . [Instruction in religious trust and values is an
integral part of the school program. It is not one more subject
alongside the rest, but instead it is perceived and functions as
the underlying reality in which the student's experiences of
learning and living achieve their coherence and their deepest
meaning.
Thus the churches try to attain their goals through the integration
of religious values and secular subject matters-true understanding
of the latter can be accomplished only by simultaneous and coordinated study of the former.' 7 Church schools, therefore, strive to
make the greatest use of "teachers who express an integrated approach to learning."' 68 The teachers they employ are, at least without NLRB regulation, subject to the direction and discipline of the
religious authorities.' 9
165. Declarationon Christian Education, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 642-43 (1966).
166. To TEACH As JESUS DID 3, 29, quoted in Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Final Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 7-8, Caulfield v. Hirsch, No. 76-279 (E.D. Pa.).
167. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
168. Pastoral Letter of American Bishops, To TEACH As JESUS DID 29 (1972).
169. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 371 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 61718 (1971).
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The NLRB has insisted that the schools perform primarily a secular function and that religious functions can be screened from the
regulatory process. 7 0 This contention creates several difficult but
pivotal issues concerning the nature of the Board's regulation and
the church-state relationship that would result.
2.

Nature of the Aid or Inhibition

The nature of the government's impact on the religiously associated institution can heavily influence the legitimacy of a regulatory scheme. As noted, general kinds of governmental aid, such as
police and fire protection are not only permissible but in all probability are compelled by the religion clauses. The parochial cases
draw the line when the state aid enters directly into the educational
function within the schools. Placement of the dividing line, or "wall
of separation," in regulatory matters will depend upon the degree
to which the state inserts itself into the policy-making processes of
the religious institution.
The NLRA enters into employers' affairs mainly through its imposition of a duty to bargain in good faith with duly certified unions.' 7 To satisfy their duty, employers must be able to justify negotiation positions with reasonable and objective criteria, although
they are not precluded from engaging in hard bargaining.' The
duty extends to bargaining over any issues relating to "wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment."'' The language,
especially terms and conditions of employment, has been given an
expansive construction.' 74 If either side raises any of these
"mandatory" subjects, then the other side must discuss them in
170. See Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d at 1115-16.
171. NLRA, § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 8(a)(5) (1970); Fireboard Paper Products v. NLRB,
379 U.S. 203 (1964). See generally GORMAN, supra note 14, at 374-539; 4 T. KHEEL, supra note
144 §§ 16.01-.04.
172. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d); H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 106 (1970).
173. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). See also id. § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
174. E.g., NLRB v. Fireboard Paper Products Corp., 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (subcontracting); I.L.G.W.U. v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (relocation); Ozark Trailers, Inc.,
161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966) (partial shutdown); Houston Chapter, Associated Gen'l. Contr. of
Am., 143 N.L.R.B. 409 (1963), enf'd, 349 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1965) (hiring practices); United
States Gypsum Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 112, amended, 97 N.L.R.B. 889 (1951), modified on other
grounds, 206 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1953) (timing and sequence of layoffs); Menard, Exploding
RepresentationAreas: Colleges and Universities,17 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 931, 977 (1976).
See generally GORMAN, supra note 14, at 503-23; 5 T. KHEEL, supra note 144, §§ 19.01-20.06.
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good faith, and unilateral decisions on the subjects are precluded.'75
Failure to bargain on such issues, if they are raised, is an unfair
labor practice.'76 The employer or union may also choose to negotiate "permissive" issues, which are not subject to Board enforcement
powers.'7 7 The Board and courts have, however, prohibited on statutory and general policy grounds certain demands and subjects from
being made a part of labor negotiations.' 78
NLRB and judicial enforcement of the duty to bargain in good
faith has cost employers much of their ability to control many policy
and management matters. In the school setting, for example, teachers and union officials can force the school administration to consult
with them and to consider their input on a wide variety of policy
matters.'79 If the school does not comply with such a request, the
employees can strike and can file an unfair labor practice complaint. The "enforcer" then is the NLRB; it can intercede and compel bargaining.' 0 The unions will naturally assert themselves as
much as possible and acquire as much control as they can. Board
enforcement powers facilitate that. On the strength of these realities, one observer of school-faculty relations has projected the typical progression of subject matters in collective bargaining for
schools:'s
Once a bargaining agent has the weight of statutory certification behind it, a familiar process comes into play. First, the
matter of salaries is linked to the matter of workload; workload
is then related directly to class size, class size to range of offerings to curricular policy. Dispute over class size may also lead
to bargaining over admissions policies.
175. NLRA § 8(a)(3) & (d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3) & (d); GORMAN, supra note 14, at
496.
176. NLRA, 99 8(a)(3) & (d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3) & (d); GORMAN, supra note 14, at
496; 5 T. KHEEL, supra note 144, § 22.03.
177. GORMAN, supra note 14, at 496-98, 523-29; 5 T. KNEEL, supra note 144, §§ 18.02, 21.01.
178. Id. § 21.02.
179. Kahn, supra note 126, at 80 & n.61. See generally Klaus, The Evolution of a Collective Bargaining Relationship in Public Education: New York City's Changing Seven- Year
History, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (1969); Note, Teacher Collective Bargaining-Who Runs the
Schools?, 2 FORDHAM URS. L.J. 505 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Teacher Collective
Bargaining];notes 181-185 and accompanying text infra.
180. GORMAN, supra note 14, at 496-98; 5 T. KHEEL, supra note 144, §§ 18.02, 19.01.
181. Brown, supra note 134, at 1075. The text and notes that follow support Brown's
assessment. See, especially the authorities cited and quoted in note 184 infra.
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This development reflects what has occurred in a very short time
in private nonsectarian schools, especially universities, and in public elementary and secondary schools.' Actually, the union bargainers have not even needed all of the steps quoted above, and have
in some circumstances argued very early in the collective bargaining
relationship that certain matters of academic policy are "terms and
conditions of employment.' ' 3 Teachers have thus been able to force
bargaining over curriculum choices, selection of texts, the substance
and variety of special educational programs, treatment of problem
pupils, class size, and school calendar."4 These subjects, though in
182. Klaus, supra note 179, provides a graphic illustration of the progression of bargaining
subjects in public school negotiations. For other treatments of collective bargaining in the
public school setting, see Kahn, supra note 126, at 80 and n.61; Teacher Collective Bargaining, supra note 179; Comment, 21 VILL. L. REV. 777 (1976). On the developments. in higher
education's expanded bargaining, see Brown, supra note 18, at 320-23; McHugh, Collective
Bargainingwith Professionalsin Higher Education 1971 Wis. L. REV. 55, 71-73.
183. See Klaus, supra note 179, especially at 1042-46.
184. The expansiveness of educational policy areas subject to collective bargaining is
becoming well documented. For example, in a 1975 Pennsylvania case, Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975), teachers
sought bargaining on a list of subjects that included questions of maximum class size, school
calendar, allocation of teachers' time while at school, and parent conferences. Comment, 21
VILL. L. REV. 777, 778 n.2 (1976). The New York City experience has revealed teachers'
insistence on bargaining over class size, teacher recruitment, improvement of "difficult"
schools, length of school year, problems with "disruptive" pupils, and experimental educational programs. Klaus, supra note 179. Elsewhere, boards have been forced to negotiate with
teachers over standards and procedures for tenure, employment of specialists (psychologists,
speech therapists, remedial reading teachers), employment of staff for special instruction in
art and music and for non English speaking students, design of, and equipment for, new or
remodeled school facilities, curriculum, new program development, priorities setting, textbook selection, election of department chairman, promotions, and discipline. Wollett, supra
note 146, at 1022-28. See also Jascourt, Metzler, Gerrard, & Dunlop, Should Methods to Deal
with Student Discipline Be Negotiated with Teacher Organizations?, 6 J.L. & EDuc. 63
(1977).
There are some who have argued that, at least in higher education, the faculty has a
legitimate interest in all academic issues, and that practically every expenditure and decision
in the operation and maintenance of an educational institution is justified on the grounds of
its contribution to a better education. Thus, there is little, if anything, beyond the scope of
faculty participation. Brown, supra note 18, at 320-24. Such logic has led to an expansive
scope of bargaining in many education institutions. Id. at 325-26; Kahn, supra note 126, at
80-81; McHugh, supra note 182, at 71-73. The president of the bargaining representative for
the faculty of the State University of New York at one point included the following subjects
(among other) in an upcoming negotiation: academic calendar, tenure policies, campus affairs, admissions, selection of all administrators-including the chancellor and deans, central
faculty authority, master-plan formulation, educational policy governing entire university,
establishment of new campuses, and intercollege agreements. Id. at 72 n.89. Mr. McHugh
summarized the developments of this "shared authority" through 1971:
Experience so far suggests that faculty will introduce into the collective bargaining
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varying degree, are all intimately related with educational policy
and value transference. The conflict is exacerbated in parochial
schools, where religion and secular instruction are integrated. Curriculum, text, and calendar decisions, for example, are premised at
least partially on sectarian rationales. Thus, in forcing parochial
schools to bargain on matters of curriculum and texts, the Board is
forcing the schools to negotiate on religiously-charged topics.
In negotiations with public schools and private universities,
teachers have thus far shown great interest in securing academic
freedom.'8 5 In parochial schools, however, "academic freedom"
raises difficult questions of whose freedom should control; for balanced against the teachers' rights are highly valued first admendment interests of parents and churches.8 6 Distinguishing the religious from the secular in matters of academic freedom can be especially complex.' 7 Any teacher-to-student value transference that is
not totally consistent with the church's philosophy could raise a
religious conflict. Whose freedom should prevail-the sponsoring
church's or the teacher's?' 8 The manner in which the hundred years
war or man's origin is explained, the selection of readings for a
modern novel course, the manner in which those books are presented and analyzed, and the inclusion or exclusion of sex education
in a health course are some examples of the kind of instructional
decisions that persistently evoke both academic freedom and reliprocess matters involving the basic policy of the academic institution and the authority of its governing board and other levels of managerial authority .... [Tihe concept
of negotiable issues covers everything from admissions, class size, academic calendar,
procedures for budget formulation, participation in physical plant planning and expansion, allocation of resources, to athletic policy and procedures for selection of administrators and department chairmen. This. . . includes a wider spectrum of matters than customarily associated with industry or public employment bargaining.
Id. at 72.
185. Menard, supra note 174, at 981-84. See also authorities cited in note 184 supra.
186. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); State of Ohio v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976).
187. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366, 371 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971); notes 99-101, 108-109 and accompanying text supra; text accompanying notes 209-236
infra.
188. The often conflicting rights of government, parents, school administrators, teachers,
and students make academic freedom a very difficult question in any circumstance; see
generally, Van Alstyne, The ConstitutionalRights of Teachers and Professors,1970 DUKE L.J.
841; Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. Rav. 1045 (1968); but it is
especially difficult in the parochial school setting, with the added dimension of church and
parental religious rights.
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gious values." 9 Can the NLRB force churches to negotiate and to
negotiate in good faith over the right to control such matters?
When presented with charges against a parochial employer for
failure to bargain, the Board's choices are:
1. To compel the church schools to bargain, and perhaps compromise, on questions the churches may deem religious;
2. To decide after investigation and, possibly, hearings and
appeals, that the case does involve religious issues and, therefore, abstain or refuse to order bargaining; or
3. To create through rulemaking broad exceptions for regulation of parochial schools.'90
Each one of these alternatives has undesirable first amendment
consequences. The first two require substantial government contact
with church schools and government scrutiny of the church's religious beliefs and values and of the school officials' motives. The
process alone could have a chilling effect on the schools' religious
freedom:' 9' they may frequently decide that litigating through the
189. The public schools, which are ostensibly neutral regarding both religion and values,
have experienced the clash of values in disputes over decisions of this type. E.g., Acanfora v.
Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974) (teacher could not be
dismissed for his activities in gay rights movement, although he could be fired for not listing
membership in gay rights group on his employment application in response to a legitimate
question); Presidents' Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d
Cir. 1972) (school board could order removal of novel, Down These Mean Streets, which
explicitly depicted ghetto life); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970)
(dismissal of teacher for assigning a particular Kurt Vonnegut short story violated teacher's
first amendment rights); Parker v. Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1965) (failure
to rehire probationary teacher did not violate his constitutional rights, even if done in response to teacher's assignment of Brave New World), aff'd on other grounds, 348 F.2d 464
(4th Cir. 1965); Todd v. Rochester, 41 Mich. App. 320, 200 N.W.2d 90 (1972) (trial court erred
in ordering removal of Slaughterhouse 5 from public school library and curriculum on theory
that the novel violated establishment clause and was obscene and valueless); Rosenberg v.
Board of Educ.,196 Misc. 542, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (judicial relief is unavailable
for plaintiffs seeking removal of Oliver Twist and Merchant of Venice from public schools
because of allegedly anti-Semitic characters in the books). See generally O'Neil, Libraries,
Librarians and First Amendment Freedoms, 4 HUM. RTs. L. REV. 295 (1975); O'Neil,
Libraries, Liberty and the First Amendment, 42 U. CINN. L. REV. 209 (1973); Seitz,
Supervision of Public Elementary and Secondary School Pupils Through State Control Over
Curriculum and Textbook Selection, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 104 (1955); Michigan Special
Project, supra note 126; Note, School Boards, Schoolbooks, and the Freedom to Learn, 59
YALE L.J. 928 (1950). See also authorities cited in notes 4, 38, 40, 186 & 188 supra.
190. The Board does, of course, have one other choice-to abstain completely.
191. Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1124 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 1231 (1978); Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. 3164, 3170-71 (E.D. Pa. No.
76-279 1977); Free Exercise Clause, supra note 8, at 660-62.
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NLRB is too costly and upsetting and will thus agree to bargain and
compromise policy questions. Moreover, the Board would grossly
offend first amendment values if it wrongly concluded that a given
matter is not "religious."
Rulemaking is also an undesirable alternative. Numerous exceptions or special classifications for church schools would require
many distinctions to be drawn along religious lines. That would
likely provoke more and greater political and policy disruptions
than would a total exemption for parochial schools.' 2 Moreover,
sifting religiously sensitive elements from parochial elementary and
secondary education is a very difficult, if not impossible, undertaking.'93 The risks of underinclusion and overinclusion would be foreboding.'94 Rulemaking would also be likely to generate administrative and judicial appeals, thereby requiring the Board and the
courts to rule on the good faith of churches and the scope of their
religious beliefs.
Subjection to Board regulation and the concomitant duty to bargain in good faith threaten parochial school officials' abilities to
maintain lines of authority and control over faculty.'9 5 Church
schools will have to deal with unions over issues of tenure and promotion, grounds and procedures for discipline and termination of
teachers, and, quite possibly, even hiring and recruiting of faculty.
The church schools may be forced to negotiate over their right to
make individual personnel decisions on the basis of a teacher's willingness and ability to convey religious values, or on the basis of a
teachers's morality.
The Board would face a predicament here. If it ordered the school
and union to bargain over the basis for personnel decisions, then the
school may be forced by the pressures of negotiation either to compromise its religious principles or to prevail on the religiously impor192. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971); United States v. Seegar, 380 U.S.
163 (1965). See also New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977); Ballard v. United
States, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
193. See notes 99-101, 108-109, and 187 and accompanying text supra.
194. Such classifications present classic challenges under both the equal protection and
establishment clauses. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. at 449 n.14; Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 696 (Harlan, J., concurring); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949). Compare McDaniel v. Paty, 98 S.Ct. at 133336 (Brennan, J., concurring) (prohibition against clerics serving as legislators violates establishment clause); with id. at 1322 (White, J., concurring) (the prohibition violates equal
protection clause).
195. See notes 182-184 supra.
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tant points by trading some economic or other benefit to the
union. 16 The latter would place still another financial burden on the
school and on the parents for sectarian education. If the Board
treated the parochial school like any other private school, then religious values could neither motivate dealings with lay personnel nor
be incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement. Finally,
if the Board created a special exception for church schools and made
religious considerations a "permissive" topic of negotiation, then,
once again, the schools would find that, to preserve their religious
concerns, they would have to compromise on other issues. Even if
the Board recognized that the schools had an inherent right to make
personnel decisions on the basis of religious motivations, employees
could contend that decisions made against them were not so motivated and that anti-union bias or some other illicit reason provoked
the school to act.'"7 Then the Board, on an unfair labor practice
charge, could find itself scrutinizing the motives of the church
school officials to determine whether they were sincerely religious."'
The nature of labor regulation in the United States would, therefore, thrust government deeply into the conduct and religious affairs
of parochial schools. Moreover, the intrusion would occur at the
most sensitive points-on decisions of policy-making and personnel
management. Such regulation effects a secularization of the schools'
religious values and missions and results in an unacceptable churchgovernment relationship.
3.

Resulting Realtionship

For most employers, NLRA coverage means ongoing and frequent
contact with the National Labor Relations Board. In the case of
parochial schools, the Board has pledged vigilance in separating the
196. The government's backing of the NLRB does increase the union's negotiating power.
See Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1123-24 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 1231 (1978). Indeed, reinforcement of unions' powers as employees' representatives was one of the Congressional purposes in enacting the NLRA. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C.

§ 151 (1970).
197. The Seventh Circuit, in its opinion in Catholic Bishop, cited several instances in
which a parochial employer had dismissed an employee for policy reasons, yet was accused
of an unfair labor practice by the discharged employee. 559 F.2d at 1125-26. The charges were
eventually dismissed, but only after Board investigation and review. In one of the cases, 3
days of testimony and 531 pages of transcript were required to reach a disposition. Id. at 1126.
198. See text accompanying notes 209-236 infra for a discussion of the constitutional implications of such scrutiny. See New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977); Ballard
v. United States, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); id. at 92-95 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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sectarian from the secular,'99 but there is a substantial doubt
whether that distinction can be made with any degree of precision
or fairness. Furthermore, the mere making of that distinction and
the potential frequency of NLRB proceedings create entanglement
problems.
a. NLRB Proceedings
Essentially, there are two kinds of NLRB cases: one examines
charges of unfair labor practices, and the other concerns union certifications and decertifications. In each case, a preliminary determination must be made that both the employer and the industry are
engaged in interstate commerce and meet the Board's jurisdictional
requirements. The Act's grant of investigatory powers to the Board
extends to all proceedings and issues. The Board may also seek
federal court assistance in certain circumstances. Review by a federal court of appeals is available for each decision of the NLRB and
the district court.
Section 8 of the NLRA defines "employer" and "union unfair
labor practices," which address all phases of labor organization,
bargaining, and the use of economic pressures.2 0 Most importantly

for present purposes, employers are proscribed from discriminating
in any way against employees for union or organizing activities, and
are required to bargain in good faith with the duly certified collective bargaining representative for the employees. Unions also have
a duty to bargain, and their organizational and strike activities have
certain fair play restrictions.
Unfair labor practice cases are initiated by a complaint filed by
the aggrieved party with the appropriate NLRB regional office.20,'
That office then investigates the allegations and decides whether a
199. See Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d at 1115, 1125.
200. 29 U.S.C. § 158. See generally GORMAN, supra note 14, at 93-366.
201. More elaborate descriptions of the procedures in unfair labor practice cases can be
found in GORMAN, supra note 14, at 7-15, 93-131; T. KAMMHOLZ & K. McGUINSS, PRAcTI cE
AND PROCEDURE BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 44-91 (1966); T. KHEEL, supra
note 144, §§ 7.02-.05.
Of course, before it can exercise its regulatory powers in a given case, the Board must decide
whether the employer is within the agency's jurisdictional guidelines. This is primarily an
economic determination that devolves from the interstate commerce clause origins of the
Board's powers to regulate employment relations. To satisfy the Board's jurisdictional standards, parochial school employer bargaining units must have an annual operating budget at
least of $1,000,000. 29 C.F.R. § 103 (1977). To make its jurisdictional determination, the
Board must therefore inquire into the financial data of the employer.
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charge should be issued. If it decides against a charge, then the
filing party may register an appeal with the NLRB's General Counsel in Washington. If the regional office or General Counsel issues a
charge, then the Counsel's office assumes a prosecutorial role; and,
if the case cannot be settled, it is referred to an Administrative Law
Judge for a full hearing. His decision is appealable to the fivemember board, and from there a case can be appealed to a federal
circuit court.
The NLRB is empowered by the Act to petition a federal district
court for appropriate temporary injunctive relief in cases of ongoing
unfair labor practices. 202 The Act thereby attempts to aid the investigation of unfair practice charges and to prevent irreparable harm
threatened by such unlawful activity.0 3
The certification process is initiated by a petition filed with a
regional NLRB office. 04 To get an election, the union must show a
substantial interest among the employees. This may be accomplished by submitting employee-signed pledge cards. The NLRB is
charged with assuring the substantiality of the employee interest
and with maintaining the purity of the secret ballot election. If a
majority of employees do vote for the union, the Board certifies it
as their collective bargaining agent and no further elections can be
held for at least one year. 25 After the expiration of that time, the
certification will remain in effect unless challenged by the employer,
a rival union, or the employees.
For each proceeding and each potential issue, the Board is blessed
with broad investigatory powers. They give the agency the right to
inspect and to copy any evidence "that relates to any matter under
investigation or in question. ' 20 6 The powers have been liberally con217
strued to maximize fact-finding efficiency and accuracy.
The Board's proceedings and powers thus precipitate a persistent
and extensive interaction among the Board, the employer, and the
202. NLRA, § 10(j), 29 U.S.C. § 160(i) (1970).
203. E.g., NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
204. Elaboration on procedures in representation cases can be found in GORMAN, supra
note 14, at 40-65. KAMMHOLZ & McGuINESS, supra note 201, at 9-41; T. KHEEL, supra note
144, § 7.01.
205. NLRA, § 9(e)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(2) (1970). Under the "Contract-Bar Rule," a
union's certification cannot, with certain exceptions, be challenged during the term of a
collective bargaining agreement (having a fixed termination date), up to a three-year maximum. General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962). See GORMAN, supra note 14, at 54-59.
206. NLRA, § 11, 29 U.S.C. § 161. See notes 150-152 and accompanying text supra.
207. See authorities cited in notes 150-151 supra.
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union. There are few aspects of the employment process that are
not, at some point, subject to some NLRB scrutiny. As shown in the
preceding section, the duty to bargain in good faith can require
employers to negotiate over many matters that are laced with management and policy considerations. Unfair labor practice cases
cover a diverse scope: employer hiring practices, job terminations,
organizing and anti-organizing activities, the bargaining process,
economic warfare, and even partial plant closings. 08 The certification and election process may often involve the Board deeply in the
relations between employer and employees.
b.

Intrusive Quality of NLRB Procedures

The Board has contended that such expansive regulation is permissible because the secular functions and activities can largely be
ferreted from the school's religious components, and because the
state interests justify whatever infringement does occur.2 s" Subsequent discussion addresses the sufficiency of the state interest.21 0
Earlier discussion has described the difficulties inherent in distinguishing between sectarian and secular activities and substance.2 1,
Even assuming the legitimacy of the Board's contentions, a significant question remains concerning the constitutional propriety of a
regulatory agency's continuous scrutiny of the extent to which the
activities of a church-affiliated institution are "religious" or
"secular." In labor relations, the scrutiny can be pervasive. For
example, the Board would have to distinguish between religious and
secular in determining mandatory and permissive issues for the bargaining process,2 2 in reviewing terminations allegedly based on reli21
gious policy grounds but challenged as an unfair labor practice,
and in defining the appropriate contours of the employees' collective
bargaining unit."'
These are the kinds of intrusive govermental decisions about
208. NLRA §§ 7-8(a)(b), 29 U.S.C. § 151-58(a)(b); GORMAN, supra note 14, at 132-539;
3 T. KHEEL, supra note 144, §§ 10.01-12.05; authorities cited in note 174 supra.
209. Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d at 1115, 1125; Cardinal Timothy
Manning, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1976).
210. Text accompanying notes 237-249 infra.
211. Notes 99-101, 108-109 , and 187 and accompanying text supra. See also notes 231235 and accompanying text infra.
212. Notes 171-185 and accompanying text supra.
213. Note 197 and accompanying text supra.
214. Notes 147-148 and accompanying text supra.
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which the Court was concerned in Walz. The property-tax exemption for churches was sustained because its alternative would engage
agencies and courts in a series of official actions involving religious
bodies, and each action would present a challenge to neutrality. Tax
collections, assessments, notices to foreclose, negotiations, and foreclosures would cumulatively threaten to become unconstitutional

entanglement .21
In reviewing judicial resolution of church disputes, the Supreme
Court has expressed many of the Walz concerns about official
decision-making in matters of religion and beliefs. The Court has
disallowed-at least in the absence of fraud or collusion-judicial
involvement in cases that require any scrutiny of a church's law or
beliefs, especially when the church hierarchy has already ruled on
the matter. 216 Judicial power, therefore, cannot be used to review
even the "arbitrariness" of a bishop's defrocking or a diocesan restructuring within a church.2 17 Courts cannot settle property disputes
that turn on an interpretation of a church's adherence to religious
tenets.21 1 Even when enforcing legislation that was enacted to effect
an important state interest, courts cannot intercede in an hierarchi2 19
cal church dispute.
Each of these decisions restricting judicial power involved some
intrusion into church governance and into religious beliefs and practices. 220 In such cases, "the hazards are ever present in inhibiting the
free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular
interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern. ' 22' The intrusion into church processes and the mere threat of compromising
religious values by civil enforcement are sufficient to justify staying
judicial powers. That the church has acted arbitrarily, or without
"due process," or even without strict adherence to its own eccle215. 397 U.S. at 674-75.
216. E.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyt. Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
See also Gonzalez v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679
(1871). See generally Sampen, Civil Courts, Church Property, and Neutral Principles: A
Dissenting View, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 543; Comment, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 904.
217. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
218. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyt. Church, 393
U.S. 440 (1969). See also Maryland and Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church
of God at Sherpsburg, 396 U.S. 367 (1970).
219. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cahtedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
220. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyt. Church, 393
U.S. at 449.
221. Id.
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siastical procedurees, does not raise the bar.122
The kind of governmental decisions being made can be more significant than the quantity of decisions. In Gillette v. United
States, 22 the Court rejected a first amendment argument that objectors to a particular war must be provided with a draft exemption
similar to that provided to those who object to all wars. Congress
could, so the Supreme Court held, draw the line where it did in
order, among other things, to avoid more frequent and persistent
examination of the sincerity of draftees' beliefs. The state should
attempt to minimize, if possible, "the potential for state involvement in determining the character of persons' beliefs and affiliations, thus 'entangl[ing] government in difficult classifications of
what is or is not religious,' ... ".
,224 In an earlier decision, Welsh v.
United States,25 the Court used that reasoning to construe, somewhat tenuously, the conscientious objector provision to include
those whose repugnance to war was premised on nonreligious or
undefined theistic beliefs. Had the inclusion not been made in
Welsh, the government would have been forced to make difficult
distinctions between beliefs. Such official intrusion into matters of
conscience may have made the exemption unconstitutional.
NLRB involvement in parochial school affairs threatens many of
the same problems as the Court encountered in the cases of selective
service and of internal church disputes. Many of the controversies
that are likely to arise in labor regulation have undertones of religious policy. Teacher terminations for failing to adhere to, or to
instruct adequately in church doctrine, or decisions about the appropriate percentages for clerics and lay instructors are, for example, situations involving church policy yet likely to spark union
reactions and NLRB litigation3225
222. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 711-720. In the Catholic schools, for example, many of the major policy questions are decided at upper levels of
the church hierarchy and then handed down through the ranks. NLRB review could mean
governmental review of the sufficiency of the hierarchy's reasoning in disputed matters, and
possibly the necessity for choosing between the local union's (and at times the parish's)
contentions and those of the Diocese or Bishop or Cardinal. The Board could thereby become
entangled in church business.
223. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
224. Id. at 457, in part quoting Justice Harlan's Walz concurrence, 397 U.S. at 698-99.
See also Ballard v. United States, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
225. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
226. See id. at 344-45, 356-61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (limitation on conscientious objector status to those who object on established religious grounds violates first amendment);
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). See notes 147-148, 197 and accompanying text
supra.
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The Court has recently reiterated its disfavor with the use of state
dispute-settlement processes to resolve sensitive religious issues. In
State of New York v. CathedralAcademy, 27 the Court considered a
statute that authorized reimbursement to sectarian schools for record keeping and testing services incurred prior to an earlier federal
court decision invalidating such payments. The school seeking reimbursement argued that the New York Court of Appeals had allowed
the reimbursement and had sustained the statute by construing it
"to require a detailed audit in the state Court of Claims to establish
whether or not the amounts claimed for mandated services constitute a furtherance of the religious purposes of the claimant." 2 ' The
construction not only failed to cure the law's previously identified
defect, but also created a fatal one of its own: "[T]his sort of
detailed inquiry into the subtle implications of in-class examinations and other teaching activities would itself constitute a significant encroachment on the protections of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments." 2' 9 The plan had the petitioning schools trying to
prove the nonreligious content of their instruction while the state
took the opposite side of that sensitive issue. The plan would cast
the Court of Claims as the arbiter in an essentially religious dispute.
"The prospect of church and state litigating in court about what
does or does not have religious meaning touches the very core of the
and it
constitutional guarantee against religious establishment,
2 30
cannot be dismissed by saying it will happen only once. 1
In NLRB cases, the issue is the same: the school and government
have merely swapped sides in the argument. Both the offensive
character of the dispute and the degree of objectionable state intrusion remain excessive.
The Court has persistently noted the undesirable, as well as futile, nature of state attempts to separate the secular from the religious. Some of the difficulties have been discussed above in the
context of the collective bargaining process and mandatory bargaining subjects.2 1 The establishment clause decisions concerning public aid for teachers' salaries have also illustrated the intractable
227. 434 U.S. 125 (1977).
228. Id. at 131-32, quoting Cathedral Academy v. State, 47 App. Div. 2d 390, 397, 366
N.Y.S. 2d 900, 906 (1975).
229. 434 U.S. at 132.
230. Id. at 133, citing with "cf." Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hall
Memorial Presbyt. Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
231. Notes 171-185 and accompanying text supra.
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problems in making secular-religious distinctions. 32 It would
"ignore reality to separate secular education functions from the predominantly religious role" of parochial schools.? The schools have
"inextricably intertwined" religious and secular functions.?2 Moreover, the prophylactics necessary to insure that government neither
aids nor inhibits religious ideology create an intolerable degree of
entanglement.2 3
The NLRB must face this dilemma, especially in regulating organizations of teachers. The difficulty of ferreting the religious from
the secular is likely to be insurmountable; but in making a serious
effort to do so effectively, the Board will need to thrust itself deeply
into the churches' and synagogues' conduct- of their schools as well
as the motives of their officers. Thus, even if merely addressing the
religious/secular question is not necessarily unconstitutional, the
efforts needed to resolve it frequently will be."s In NLRB regulation,
the question is likely to be recurrent and complex; that potential
precludes the Board from constitutionally asserting itself into parochial education.
D.

Governmental Interests

The state may be able to justify intrusions on first amendment
religious interests by showing that its actions are necessary to advance a substantial countervailing interest. Certainly, this balancing approach is appropriate in most free exercise cases. There is,
however, considerable doubt whether any state interest can justify
excessive entanglement with religious institutions. The Supreme
Court has yet to find that such a relationship can be justified by a
weightier state interest. 7 Indeed in the parochial decisions, the
232. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971);
notes 108-109 and accompanying text supra.
233. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 365.
234. Id. at 366.
235. Id. at 370-71. See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 618-20.
236. State of New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977); Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
237. See Establishment Clause, supra note 28, at 1174-78. Of course, the Court may, in
effect, balance sub silentio when it determines whether some particular entanglement is
"excessive," and thus violative of the first amendment. The cases, however, do not appear
to substantiate that. E.g., compare Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 241-48 (publicly supported
diagnostic, therapeutic, guidance and remedial services by public counselor provided in neutral sites for parochial school children do not create excessive entanglement) with id. at 25255 (publicly provided field trips for parochial school children would create excessive entanglement) and Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 371 (publicly supported remedial and therapeutic
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Court has acknowledged that the church schools are in grave financial circumstances and that their perpetuation is essential for the
states to avoid a crisis in the public schools.138 Fearing, however,
that legislation in aid of parochial schools created untoward entanglement, the Court has unhesitatingly invalidated it.
The ensuing discussion assumes, however, that the free exercise
character of the church schools' objections to government regulation
requires a reviewing court to balance the competing state and free
exercise interests. In so doing, the court should be careful to weigh
the state interest only to the extent it applies to the affected institutions, less any mitigations from available alternatives that would
23
not be so restrictive on the religious rights. '
In the context of labor regulation, the federal government wants
to prevent labor unrest, preserve the free flow of commerce, and
secure employees' rights. ' The Board has argued that these are
paramount and legitimate purposes2. 4 Indeed they are. When the
affected employer, however, is a religious institution, then those
interests should be valued only to the extent that similar religious
institutions can threaten the state interests. Parochial schools control, collectively, a major segment of elementary and secondary education, and they do engage in a substantial amount of commerce.
Nevertheless, the schools are neither that large, nor that important
a cog in our commercial-industrial chain, that their labor problems
could cause serious disruption; nor do the schools have a history of
serious labor problems. The NLRB's primary interest in regulating
parochial schools, therefore, lies in protecting the organizational
rights of the schools' employees.
Of course, the employees can still unionize without the NLRB's
oversight. Indeed, many parochial schools have permitted their
teachers to organize."' If the religious schools are to compete with
the public schools for quality lay teachers, they must keep pace in
counseling given inside the parochial schools created too great a risk for excessive entanglement).
238. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 624-25. See also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 38687; id. at 386-87 (Burger, C.J., concurring in judgment and dissenting); PEARL v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. at 763-64; id at 817-19 (White, J., dissenting).
239. See authorities cited in note 81 supra. See also Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior
Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REv. 539, 543-44 (1977).
240. NLRA,.§ 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151.
241. Cardinal Timothy Manning, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1976); First Church of Christ, Scientist in Boston, 194 N.L.R.B. 1006, 1007-08 (1972).
242. See, e.g., Free Exercise Clause, supra note 8, at 646-47.
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employee relations and benefits. That will frequently mean unions.
The schools' objection is not so much with unions, as it is with
government compulsion and its attendant costs in money, effort,
and policy sacrifices."'
The Board has contended that the resolution of conflicting governmental and religious interests is controlled by several recent appellate and administrative precedents.4 Those decisions sustained the Board's jurisdictional assertions over lay employers who
had claimed that compliance with the NLRA violated their religious
beliefs and, thus, their free exercise rights. The cases may well have
been correctly decided, yet they do not control parochial school
challenges to Board regulation because the interests on both sides
of the balance are quite different.
The Board's concerns are weightier when the employer is not a
religious institution. To allow exceptions for lay employers claiming
a religious objection would invite spurious claims. A total exemption could threaten the effectiveness of the laws by providing a
loophole across the breadth of employers. Moreover, Board inquiries
into the nature and sincerity of the claimed religious beliefs would
raise serious first amendment problems. Finally, traditional notions
of "religious" do not encompass theoretical objections to regulation
by the NLRB; such protests smack more of economics than theol5
ogy.u
More importantly, though, when the employer is a religious institution, like a parochial school, the free exercise interests are considerably more serious and complex. 246 In such cases, the affront to the
first amendment lies not only in a conflict between principles, but
also in the inhibitory effect and entanglement engendered by the
government regulation and by the intrusion of government into religious decision-making.24 The claims of established religious organi243. See, e.g., Hubbell, supra note 3, at 341. See also Schulte, supra note 157, at 334-35.
244. Cap Santa Vue v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Good Foods Corp., 195
N.L.R.B. 418 (1972), enforced, 492 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1974); Western Meat Packers, Inc.,
148 N.L.R.B. 444 (1964), enf. denied on other grounds, 350 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1965). For a
sample of the Board's arguments using these cases, see Brief for the NLRB in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction 11-14, Caulfield v. Hirsch, Civ. No. 76-279 (E.D.
Pa. 1977).
245. Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) with authorities cited in note 244,
supra; cf. Note, Toward a ConstitutionalDefinition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1056 (1978).
246. Free Exercise Clause, supra note 8, at 670-71.
247. As explained in text following notes 126 and 156 supra, those circumstances (entanglement and intrusion) form the gravamen of the parochial schools' free exercise and establishment clause claims.
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zations, which have compounded first amendment rights through
free exercise and associational interests, merit a different constitutional treatment than do the religious freedom contentions of indi8
viduals.1
In the context of government regulation of church schools, the
appropriate treatment must account for the presence of extraordinary free exercise interests in one of organized religion's primary
functions-the transference of shared values and beliefs from one
generation to the next. Church schools represent the collective interests of parents in rearing their children. Certainly, parochial schools
offer parents a meaningful choice in guiding the education, religious
upbringing, and value acquisitions of their offspring. As shown
above,"' such parental interests add weight to the free exercise side
of the balancing process. The resultant burden on the NLRB is
telling.
Thus, the first amendment interests of parochial schools outweigh
the government's interests in labor regulation of the schools, and the
NLRB cannot show that its jurisdiction over parochial schools is
necessary to effectuate the NLRA's purposes. The slight degree to
which those schools might either adversely affect commerce or discourage employee organization legitimizes neither the dangerous
potential for excessive entanglement between the Board and the
schools nor the inhibitory effects that Board regulation is likely to
have on the schools and their religious-educational purposes.
E.

The AP Case and Incipient Dangers

The Court has previously addressed a first amendment challenge
to application of the NLRA to a particular employer. Associated
Press v. NLRB25 held that the Board can order reinstatement and
backpay for an editorial employee of an organization that gathers
and disseminates news, if the reasons for the discharge had been the
employees' union activities. Even though the federal government
could not interfere with AP's rights to make personnel decisions on
the basis of employee performance or conformity to editorial policy,
248. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
249. Notes 65-69 and accompanying text supra. See also notes 305-308 and accompanying
text infra.
250, 301 U.S. 103 (1937). The decision was one of a composite of decisions that the Court
addressed in susfining the constitutionality of the NLRA. The major holding was in NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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Congress could restrict the employer's ability to retaliate against an
employee for his organizational efforts.
Certainly AP v. NLRB lends support to the Board's position that
it can constitutionally regulate parochial schools, yet there are fundamental distinctions between AP and the schools' circumstances;
and those distinctions severely limit the case's authority in a church
school challenge. The most obvious, and the most telling, difference
is that AP did not involve a religious institution. The distinction has
substance not because freedom of religion is more important than
freedom of the press, but because the nature of the NLRB's conduct
is more likely to offend the former than the latter. While there are
limits to the degree to which government can involve itself with the
press,25 1 only in freedom of religion cases has the Court defined
substantial limits on excessive government entanglement with private institutions. Only freedom of religion has an establishment, as
2
well as a free exercise, clause. 2
Religion does add special considerations. Thus the Court has
stated that in some circumstances religiously motivated activity
will be protected, while secular-based conduct of the same nature
would not be. For example, the Court's opinion in Yoder carefully
limited its holding to religious groups like the Amish, and distinguished groups whose common beliefs were not intertwined with
religion, even though the latter groups could have substantial asso3
ciational and free speech rights affected by compulsory education.2
Moreover, the Associated Press, publishers, and newspapers have
been held subject to the antitrust laws.2' Does it follow that the
251. At least, one would assume that there are some limits after reading cases restricting
government's ability to make editorial decisions. E.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241 (1974) New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). See Landmark
Communications Inc. v. Virginia, 98 S. Ct. 1535, 1546 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring). That
assumption, however, has been questioned by holdings authorizing (inter alia) searches of
newsrooms without a prior adversarial hearing and use of the contempt power to secure
newsmen's sources. E.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
252. That is not to say, however, that there may not be some kind of an implied
"establishment clause" limitation (independent of religion) on government's power to propagandize or exercise thought control. See Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 461-62 (4th Cir.
1973); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 697-716 (1970); Gottlieb,
Government Allocation of First Amendment Resources, 40 U. Prrr. L. REv. (forthcoming
1979). See also authorities in notes 37-40 and 188-189 supra.
253. 406 U.S. at 235-36.
254., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). See also Citizens Publishing
Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
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federal government could bust parochial school monopolies or preclude their mergers? That is a very grim, and fortunately improbable, prospect. Finally, the AP majority was wholly unconcerned
about the likelihood of future invasions of freedom of the press; the
Court said it would handle those problems when they arise. 5 In
religious freedom cases, however, the Court has persistently avoided
even the potential for excessive church-state entanglement.25
Of course, in 1937, the date of AP's decision, the Court would have
needed Cassandra-like prescience to appreciate the expansive nature of government regulation. New Deal reform was in its early
stages, and the judiciary was reluctant to overturn any legislative
or administrative action. Had the Court comprehended the eroding
tendency of government agencies, it may have been more sensitive
2 7
to AP's concerns for potential first amendment impairments. 1
Since 1937, the Court has developed that sensitivity in establishment clause decisions and has been extremely cautious in approving
any church-state relations lest it launch a trend that would be difficult to stop. That danger should weigh heavily in considering NLRB
jurisdiction over parochial schools. Permitti ng such regulation,
which is aimed at the very heart of religious value transferenceadolescent education in church and synagogue schools-would
license the now gargantuan government agencies to scrutinize
freely the activities of religious institutions. The Court's warning
25
in Lemon should be heeded:
[M]odern governmental programs have self-perpetuating and
self-expanding propensities. These internal pressures are only
enhanced when the schemes involve institutions whose legitimate needs are growing and whose interests have substantial
political support. Nor can we fail to see that in constitutional
adjudication some steps, which when taken were thought to
approach "the verge," have become the platform for yet further
255. 301 U.S. at 131-32.
256. See authorities cited in note 140 supra; note 258 and accompanying text infra.
257. That is to suggest that AP may well have been wrongly decided. Freedom of the press
has experienced great doctrinal changes since 1937, and AP's facts could bring about a
different result today. In 1957, Justice Sutherland's dissent on first amendment grounds drew
four votes. 301 U.S. at 133-41.
258. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 624. See also PEARL v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 797
n.56; Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 29 and passim (Rutledge, J., dissenting); cf.
authorities cited in note 191 supra (threat of burgeoning administrative regulation can have
a "chilling effect" on parochial schools' free exercise rights).
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steps .... The dangers are increased by the difficulty of perceiving in advance exactly where the "verge" of the precipice
lies.
Protection of sectarian independence thus requires meticulous
analysis, in any regulatory case, of the nature of the state involvement and interests. Courts should not approve government regulation of a religiously-affiliated institution unless completely satisfied
that the state will not effect church policy through inhibitory effects
or excessive entanglement.
IV.

THE CONTROLLING FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES

The Supreme Court has often noted a "tension" between the
establishment and free exercise clauses. The nature of that tension,
however, has not been fully articulated. At times, the clauses have
been described as potentially conflicting: "it may often not be possible to promote the [free exercise clause] without offending the
[establishment clause]." 2" 9 Both clauses are "cast in absolute
terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would
tend to clash with the other."260 Yet, even though "they forbid two
quite different kinds of governmental encroachment upon religious
freedom" 26' the two clauses frequently overlap.
The Court has responded to this constitutional ambivalence by
proclaiming a policy of neutrality in religious affairs 2 2 and by accommodating free exercise and establishment concerns through
doctrinal flexibility.26 3 The Court has found this "play-in-thejoints"26 ' to be essential in a society in which some church259. PEARL v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973).
260. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
261. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), quoting Engle v. Vitale, 270
U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962).
262. E.g., PEARL v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 788; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234-35
n.22; Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 669; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 409.
263. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221; Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 669.
The relationship between the religious clauses can be viewed as symbiotic, especially in the
sense that the free exercise clause legitimates certain actions that advance (or accommodate)
religion but that would otherwise violate the establishment clause. Dodge, supra note 113, at
705-06. See Freund, supra note 101, at 1686; notes 113-115 and accompanying text supra. See
generally, Gianella, supra note 113. Examples of such a relationship are property tax exemptions for churches (Walz, supra) and exemptions from compulsory school attendance for
Amish (Yoder, supra).
264. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 669. But see Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. at 26 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("This freedom [of religion] was first in the Bill of Rights
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government contact is unavoidable. An accommodating flexibility,
with neutrality as the goal, has thus been offered as a comprehensive rationale for free exercise-establishment clause conflict.
Certainly, that is one approach to the problem; but it avoids some
tough analysis. "Neutrality," while surely a first amendment concern, is too elusive a concept to withstand substantial reliance.6 5
For example, the Court claimed to be steering neutral courses (as
always) in Yoder and Sherbert. In Yoder, was not Wisconsin neutral
in treating all parents similarly? In Sherbert, had not South Carolina subjected all unemployment compensation applicants to the
same regulations? Were not these individuals asking for special dispensation from the State? In the establishment clause parochial
cases, were not parents of church school children entitled to get
educational returns on their tax dollars the same as any other
parents? 6 Why should the former pay double? Would not tuition
reimbursements for parochial school parents "neutralize" that
injustice? Is there any consistent pattern of "neutrality" to the answers the Court has reached on these questions? Indeed, the justices
have frankly admitted that logic has not been the hallmark of their
decisions in these and similar cases. 67 No one can dispute that
government should be neutral in addressing religion, that it should
neither advance nor inhibit one religion, all religions, or no religion,
but "neutrality" is a goal more easily stated than achieved and is
not easily reduced to principles for application in individual instances of constitutional adjudication.
Nevertheless, there are broad democratic values that both undergird the first amendment and justify the results in most of the
religious freedom cases. These values have been expressed at times
by members of the Court. They are interwoven with the rationales
for other first amendment provisions, and they offer substantial
guidance in delicately balancing competing interests and in reaching results in actual cases.
The values are related, yet distinct. One is a utilitarian preference
for pluralism-especially in those matters which are the first
amendment's primary concern-ideas and beliefs. The other is a
because it was first in the forefathers' minds: it was set forth in absolute terms, and its
strength is its rigidity").
265. See, e.g., Freund, supra note 101, at 1686.
266. But see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 58-60 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
267. E.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 257 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting);
id. at 262 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 614.
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genuine commitment to the worth of the individual: in certain matters-again those addressed by the first amendment-the individual should be the supreme decision-maker."'8 These two values have
formed a bulwark in our constitutional history and demand application in any free exercise-establishment clause overlap.
Pluralism in religious creed and in expression has been a keystone
in our history. From the earliest colonial days through the present,
individuals and groups have settled in America to escape religious
persecution abroad. This background was foremost in the founders'
minds when they drafted the Bill of Rights.269 The United States has
continued to be a haven for political, religious, and economic refugees. The country has absorbed and accepted, though often painfully, these immigrants with strange languages and religions. The
diversity and breadth of insights, culture, and experience they have
contributed have become a national treasure. 0
The value in this heritage depends upon the abilities of the diverse groups and individuals to contribute to our society while still
retaining their own philosophical, cultural, and religious identities,
should they so desire. The first amendment encourages development and preservation both of cultures and ideas that have been
imported and of those that have been conceived and nurtured
within the United States. Through this diversity, we achieve a
See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374-76 (1927); 1 N. DORSEN, P. BENDER, &
NEUBORNE, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 3-9 (4th ed. 1976); L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 576-79 (1978); Constitutional Definition, supra note 102, at
1058. See also Note, Cultural Pluralism, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1978) [hereafter
268.

B.

cited as Cultural Pluralism]; Note, Toward a Constitutional Theory of Individuality: The
Privacy Opinions of Justice Douglas, 87 YALE L.J. 1579 (1978) [hereafter cited as
Individuality].
CulturalPluralism identifies three first amendment rationales: freedom of conscience as a
good in itself, as a precondition of emotional well-being, and as promoting pluralism. Concededly, that is a valid, and perhaps philosophically necessary, breakdown. This article asserts,
however, that the first and second rationales mutually premise the constitutional individualism described in the text. See notes 288-293 and accompanying text infra.
269. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214 (1963) ("Nothing but the most
telling of personal experiences in religious persecution suffered by our forebears . . . could
have planted our belief in liberty of religious opinion any more deeply in our heritage.");
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 8-11; id. at 33-43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); Cultural
Pluralism, supra note 268, at 133.
270. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216-19; Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 689; West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 64-42 (1943); H. KALLEN, CULTURAL
PLURALISM AND THE AMERICAN IDEA (1956); Cultural Pluralism, supra note 108, especially at
133-36 and n.15; ConstitutionalDefinition, supra note 102, at 1058-60. Pluralism, of course,
facilitates freedom of choice and belief by offering and preserving the greatest selection of
ideas and beliefs. Id.
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richer society, one that can thrive on the multiplicity of expression
and perceptions while, hopefully, sorting out the valuable ideas and
customs from those that are based on prejudice or error.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged and supported pluralistic
goals. Meyer v. Nebraska,27 ' Pierce v. Society of Sisters,"2 and
Wisconsin v. Yoder'13 are prime examples. Each recognized the
state's interest in having individuals educated and integrated into
society, yet each decision also recognized a constitutional interest
in allowing religious or ethnic sects to educate their own, so long as
they meet certain minimum instructional standards. Meyer thus
invalidated a state ban on foreign language instruction; Pierce recognized the right to private and parochial education; Yoder upheld
the rights of the Amish to train their children in the Amish way of
life. The decisions were premised upon the constitutional preference
to preserve diversity.
Each provision of the first amendment thrives on pluralism.24T
Basic utilitarian theory makes the effectiveness of the rights of
speech and press directly proportionate to the number and variety
of voices and publishers. The marketplace of ideas prospers when
there is a great diversity of expressed opinions. Society is thereby
better informed and more capable of deciding important social and
political questions.
Pluralism through group expression also promotes first amendment goals; and this pluralism has found protection through the
amendment's freedom of assembly, speech, and religion clauses. 275
This right to organize, join, and participate in groups facilitates
effective communication. The more diverse groups there are, the
greater the quality of the marketplace.
The amendment's dependence on a pluralistic society is pervasive
and heavy. Promoting pluralism promotes the first amendment.
Judge Learned Hand eloquently described the relationship in
271. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
272. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
273. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Accord Ohio v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750
(1976).
274. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); United States v. Associated Press,
52 F. Supp. 362, 273-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (L. Hand., J.), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Cultural
Pluralism, supra note 268, at 138-43. See authorities cited and discussed in notes 268-270
supra.
275. E.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
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United States v. Associated Press,"' which rejected AP's free press
defense to an antitrust action for monopolistic practices:
[Njeither exclusively, nor even primarily, are the interests of
the newspaper industry conclusive; for that industry serves one
of the most vital of all general interests; the dissemination of
news from as many different sources, and with as many different facets and colors as is possible. That interest is closely akin
to, if indeed it is not the same as, the interest protected by the
First Amendment; it presupposes that right conclusions are
more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is,
and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.
Preserving pluralism has been especially important in construing
the religion clauses. As stated, the clauses grew out of the founders'
exposure to religious persecution and the bitter divisiveness that
followed from government compulsion and prohibition of religious
faith. By promoting and guaranteeing diversity, the founders were
able to reduce such malice and tension. The greater the availability
of diverse religious groups and teachings, the more tolerant a society
will likely be. The mere presence of having constitutional restraints
can have a positive psychological impact.27
Nowhere has governmental action been so threatening to religious
pluralism as in the Supreme Court's establishment clause cases
regarding elementary, and secondary schools. Two general schemes
have presented themselves. First, the states attempted, through
their public schools, to conduct religious exercises, specifically, organized, released time activities, Bible readings, and daily prayer.
By reason of the State's powerful imprimatur,25 these exercises
coerced a conformity to the prevailing Christian religion and wore
down those with nonconforming faiths. The Supreme Court, therefore, invalidated the conduct of any religious exercises in the public
schools.
The Court's opinions on state aid to parochial schools evidence
the same commitment to pluralism. At first glance, the cases may
276. 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
277. See Freund, supra note 101, at 1692 ("It was healthy when President Kennedy, as a
candidate, was able to turn off some of the questions addressed to him on church-state
relations by pointing to binding Supreme Court decisions.").
278. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 221; Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
430-31 (1962).
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appear to run counter to perpetuation of the church school systems.
Yet the Court has shown great insight in recognizing that government aid is usually followed by government regulation."' At the
very least, the schools can become dependent upon the government
aid, and will compromise their religious goals in order to avoid offending or displeasing government officials. In turn, the leverage
commanded by those officials over the church schools could become
frighteningly potent. This process necessarily leads to secularization
and homogenization of the creed. 280 Thus, the Supreme Court has
limited state aid to church schools to reimbursement for services
that satisfy a state need but neither present the opportunity for
religious inculcation nor are related to the church schools' basic
instructional mission. 2s'
The threats to pluralism posed by the government's actions in the
two lines of establishment clause cases, as well as in the MeyerPierce-Yoder decisions, are particularly formidable because the actions are directed at primary and secondary education, where
everyone in this country spends his/her formative years. That
makes those schools the most effective means for transmitting
information and infusing values.28 2 For example, public education
here has traditionally been the great melting pot. The state has
seized the opportunity to inculcate and conform impressionable
youth to prevailing perceptions and roles.2 13 That may be valuable
279. E.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 621; Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 675;
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 27-28 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("If the state may aid
these religious schools, it may therefore regulate them.") See authorities in and accompanying text to note 141 supra and note 280 infra.
280. Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 772 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 621; id. at 649
(Brennan, J., concurring); Freund, supra note 101, at 1685-86.
281. E.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); see text accompanying notes 86-123
and 156-236 supra.
282. E.g., In re Shinn, 16 Cal. Rptr. 165, 168 (1961); Stephens v. Bongart, 15 N.J. Misc.
80, 189 A. 131, 137 (1937); Berkman, Students in Court: Free Speech and the Functions of
Schooling in America, 40 HARv. EDUC. REv. 567, 569 (1970); Woltz, Compulsory Attendance
at School, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 3 (1955). See generally Michigan Special Project, supra
note 126. See also Hutchins, The Schools Must Stay, 6 CENTER MAG. 12 (Jan/Feb. 1973);
McClintock, Universal Voluntary Study, id. at 24.
283. E.g., L. CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL 66-75 (1962); R. KAY, OUR
AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM 8 (1969); C. TEScONI, SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 147-72 (1975); D.
TYACK, TURNINGPOINTS IN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL HISTORY 228-63 (1967); Reutter, The Law
and the Curriculum, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91 (1955); Seitz, Controlof Textbook Selection,
id. at 104; authorities cited in notes 38, 40, 186, 188-89, & 282 supra.
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to a degree; but it quite obviously can endanger, among other
things, a society's pluralism.18
Whatever public education's status is, our systems of parochial
schools have offered and continue to offer an alternative. They have
provided an opportunity for parents to educate their children in a
fashion that allows inclusion of religious thought at approprate
moments and in conjunction with the secular training. (Some experts believe that method to be essential for a complete, meaningful
education).2 5 Of course, indoctrination of impressionable youth occurs in church schools; that is one of the schools' avowed purposes.
The students are urged to conform to the sect's philosophy. Parents
at least have a choice, and religious and cultural diversity has a
better opportunity to survive when parochial schools are assured of
an independent operation. The Court deserves plaudits for helping
to sustain that independence from the State.
These concerns for pluralism have significance for the NLRB's
efforts to regulate parochial schools. Through such regulation, the
schools are compelled to conform to a certain model. As described
above, that model holds a dangerous potential for compromising the
school on its sectarian philosophy, chiefly through compulsory bargaining on selected subjects and monitoring of hiring, firing, and
other personnel decisions. Such regulation is particularly offensive
because parochial schools would be subjected to the "strings" that
go with government dollars, but would not be eligible for the dollars.3' Moreover, NLRB regulation would be a giant leap onto a very
slippery slope; more government regulation would surely lie further
down the slope. The threat to our pluralism at its most susceptible
point-the education of youth-would be substantial.8 7
The second value that underpins the religion clauses is a fundamental precept of the first amendment, as well as of the entire Bill
284. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 334-35 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting
from remand on mootness grounds); New Rider v. Board of Educ., 414 U.S. 1097, 1097-1103
(1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-19;
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Emerson & Haber, The Scopes Case in Modern
Dress, 27 U. CHI. L. Rav. 522 (1960); Kalven, A Commemorative Case Note: Scopes v. State,
id. at 505; authorities cited in notes 188-89 supra.
285. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 46-47 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); BOWER,
CHURCH AND STATE IN EDUCATION 58 (1944); notes 165-68 and accompanying text supra. See
also S. BROWN, THE SECULARIZATION OF AMmuCAN EDUCATION 1-25 (1912, reissued 1967).
286. Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d at 1119, 1130: notes 142-143 and
accompanying text supra; cf. notes 141, 279-280 and accompanying text supra.
287. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209-12; CulturalPluralism, supra note 268, at 146-
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of Rights and the fourteenth amendment. 5 The thrust of the first
amendment elevates the individual to supreme decision-maker in
matters of ideas and conscience, and makes the freedoms of religion,
speech, press, and association ends in themselves.29 The amendment also reflects the belief that the "pursuit of happiness" or, in
more modern language, psychological well-being, is dependent upon
one's freedom to speak, write, associate, and believe as one
pleases. 2 0 Although we have recognized more utilitarian justifica-

tions for the first amendment,"' the inherent value in letting an
individual speak and believe as he pleases is just as, if not more,
important a rationale. As a corollary to its protection of the need
for expression, the first amendment makes the individual a fortress
292
protected against government compulsion or thought control.
Each of the first amendment's provisions sustains a rugged individualism. Thus public expression may be protected even though it
is offensive to some, 93 or is generally recognized as potentially dangerous, 94 or is made within the halls of a public school.295 Despite
288. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Individualism, supra note 268. For
a more global perspective on this value, see generally McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, The Right
to Religious Freedom and World Public Order: The Emerging Norm of Nondiscrimination,
74 MICH. L. REv. 865 (1976).
289. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting'; discussion and authorities cited in note 268 supra.
290. E.g., Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARv. L. REv. 327, 342 (1969)
("[Tihe most important interest protected by the free exercise clause is the prevention of
the severe psychic turmoil that can be brought about by compelled violations of conscience."); ConstitutionalDefinition, supra note 102, at 1058.
291. Scholars and the Court alike have noted that the first amendment establishes and
protects a marketplace of ideas designed to foster political exchange, to promote new and
valuable ideas, to search for the truth, etc. E.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964); DoRsEN, supra note 268, at 4-7, quoting J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 15, 24-25, 30-31, 4041, 47-48 (McCallum ed. 1946). See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, PoLrrICAL FREEDOM (1960);
notes 270-277 and accompanying text supra.
292. E.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,
418 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring in judgment); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959);
P.U.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 469 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting); West Virginia Board of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Lipp v. Morris, 579 F.2d 834 (3rd Cir. 1978) (school
children could not be forced to stand at attention during pledge of allegiance to the flag);
Emerson & Haber, supra note 284; Kalven, id.
293. E.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (ordinance proscribing
exhibition of nudity on outdoor movie screen violated first amendment); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971) ("Fuck the Draft" on back of jacket could not be punished under a
disturbing the peace ordinance).
294. E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111
(1969).
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the near worthlessness of some speech, countervailing state interests
cannot override a person's need for self-expression without a showing of compelling neccessity. 21 The provisions of the first amendment which protect individuals and the press from state coercion
are also matters of speech and conscience9 7 and create a zone of
individual privacy into which government cannot intrude. 298 The
NAACP cases guaranteed that a right to anonymity in one's organizational activities and memberships attends the right to association.2 99 Talley v. Californiam assured the same anonymity in the
distribution of printed materials. The Court has recognized. rights
within the home both to read whatever one pleases and to be free
from unwanted communication. These protections are premised
upon a recognition of the supremacy and worth of the individual
within certain spheres.? 1
This concept of individualism was deemed by the first amendment's authors to be most critical in matters of religion. The founders specifically included both an establishment and a free exercise
clause to be certain that government did not interfere in religious
concerns.3 2 The Supreme Court has honored that mandate in its
decisions. Thus, "the realm of religious training and belief remains,
as the amendment made it, the kingdom of the individual man and
295. E.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Commun. School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(students' rights to wear black arm band in protest of Viet Nam War); West Virginia Board
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (right to refuse to pledge allegiance to the flag). Of
course, faculty and students cannot make a Hyde Park out of public schools, but the cases
do reflect a Supreme Court concern that students retain their individualism. For a contrast
in views among the justices over the appropriate role for students in public schools, compare
Tinker, supra (majority opinion) with id. at 522-23 (Black J., dissenting) ("[TIaxpayers send
children to school on the premise that at their age they need to learn, not teach.").
296. E.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
297. E.g., Landmark Commun., Inc. v. Virginia, 436 U.S. 1535, 1546 (1978) (Stewart, J.,
concurring); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
298. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). But see Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
299. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See also Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1
(1971); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
300. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
301. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728
(1970).
302. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 215-22; McCollum v. Board
of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 227 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. at 14-15; id. at 23-24, 26-27 (Jackson, J., concurring). See also Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968); West Virginia Board of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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The individual's choice in religious matters must be

kept "inviolately private."ss4
The religion clauses, with their dual protection, have justifiably
commanded special attention in sealing off an area for individual
privacy and in repelling government attempts to control matters of
conscience. Our culture views religion as the most sensitive and
personal of life's elements, as the root from which all other values
and traditions grow. Nothing lies so close to the individual's conscience as his feelings towards his God. Historically, religious controversies have provoked the most emotional (and, therefore, frequently irrational) responses. Like the individualist-centered interpretation of the first amendment, there is an irreducible, valuebasic quality to much of religious thinking. Fundamental and intimate considerations of family, love, death, and sex intertwine with
religion.
The Supreme Court in Pierce and Yoder, therefore, committed
religious education and upbringing to the family's and the church's
private processes. West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette3" protected public school children from a state attempt at
thought control by requiring a religious exemption from compulsory
pledges to the flag. 3" The free exercise and establishment clauses
combine here to build a barrier around the individual and to guarantee private decision-making in religious affairs.
In practical terms, the private decision-making processes protected by this individualism include not only the choice made by a
family to send a child to a parochial school, but also the parochial
school's operations. 307 "The Constitution decrees that religion must
303. 330 U.S. at 57-58 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). This right is particularly critical in
parental choices concerning education of their offspring. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). For a discussion of the need for
freedom of choice in family education decisions and on the extent of intrusive state control,
see Coons & Sugarman, Family Choice in Education:A Model State System for Vouchers,
59 CAUF. L. REv. 321, 324-25 (1971). See also discussions of the concept of "voluntarism" by
Professor Freund and Justice Harlan in, respectively, Freund, supra note 101, at 1684-86, and
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 694-97.
304. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 58 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). See also id. at
51.
305. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
306. Accord, Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636 (3d Cir. 1973); Spence v. Bailey, 465 F.2d 794
(6th Cir. 1972). See also Lipp v. Morris, 579 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1978); authorities cited in notes
38, 40, 252, 284, & 295 supra. But see Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
307. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Ohio v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181,
351 N.E.2d 750 (1976). See also Walz v. Tax. Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 672.
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be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice .... ,,1 Some governmental impact on such
schools is inevitable and permissible, but the first amendment will
not permit the extent of disruption on schools' and parents' private
policy making that would be occasioned by NLRB regulation.
When government regulatory schemes seriously affect religious
institutions, courts reviewing challenges cannot decide the case
merely by trying to find government "neutrality." The courts' decisions should also reflect the overriding policies of the first amendment, that we constitutionally embrace a pluralistic society and
that we have cherished a zone of individualism in religious and
private affairs into which the state cannot enter. The analysis in
cases such as NLRB regulation should follow the model offered
above, in Part III, and the ultimate balancing and tough decisions
must be made with full consideration of the two identified first
amendment policies.
308. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 625. The schools represent both institutional and
parental rights in religious education. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

